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Mental Illness and the Second Amendment
CLAYTON E. CRAMER

In the past, American laws seldom attempted to regulate the
possession of firearms by the mentally ill. This surprising tradition
has waned following a recent series of highly-publicized mass
murders that were committed by persons who were identifiably
mentally ill before the crime occurred. These tragedies have focused
attention on the question of how a free society should handle the
conflict between the Second Amendment’s “right of the people” and
the needs of public safety. This Article examines why mental healthrelated firearm regulations suddenly became necessary, analyzes the
attendant conflicts between civil liberties and public safety, and
suggests some strategies to deal with these conflicts.
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Mental Illness and the Second Amendment
CLAYTON E. CRAMER*
I. INTRODUCTION
It should not be surprising that severe mental illness and the
commission of violent crimes, including murder, are strongly correlated in
the United States.1 Multiple studies of those charged or convicted of
violent crimes in other countries have likewise found that the severely
mentally ill commit a disproportionate number of such crimes.2 Most
*
Adjunct Faculty, College of Western Idaho. Cramer authored such books as Armed America:
The Remarkable Story of How and Why Guns Became as American as Apple Pie and Concealed
Weapon Laws of the Early Republic: Dueling, Southern Violence, and Moral Reform, which was cited
in Justice Breyer’s dissenting opinion in McDonald v. Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3132 (2010). Among
other articles, he co-authored Clayton E. Cramer & Joseph Edward Olson, What Did “Bear Arms”
Mean in the Second Amendment?, 6 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 511 (2008), which was cited in Justice
Scalia’s majority opinion in District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 588 (2008), and Clayton E.
Cramer, Nicholas J. Johnson & George A. Mocsary, “This Right Is Not Allowed by Governments That
Are Afraid of the People”: The Public Meaning of the Second Amendment when the Fourteenth
Amendment Was Ratified, 17 GEO. MASON L. REV. 823 (2010), which was cited in Justice Alito’s
majority opinion in McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3039 n.21, 3041 n.25, 3043 (2010).
Cramer’s most recent book is My Brother Ron: A Personal and Social History of the
Deinstitutionalization of the Mentally Ill, which combines a scholarly history of mental illness laws and
the experiences of his family when his older brother suffered a schizophrenic breakdown in the 1970s.
He thanks George Mocsary, Dave Hardy, Basil Copeland, Robin Roberts, Casey Smith, Cassandra
Beckman Widay, Jeffrey Wisner, and Ryan Carpenter for their comments and suggestions in
connection with this Article.
1
See, e.g., Jeanne Y. Choe et al., Perpetration of Violence, Violent Victimization, and Severe
Mental Illness: Balancing Public Health Concerns, 59 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 153, 161 (2008)
(surveying a host of empirical studies and concluding that “violence and violent victimization are more
common among persons with severe mental illness than in the general population”); Eric B. Elbogen &
Sally C. Johnson, The Intricate Link Between Violence and Mental Disorder: Results from the National
Epidemiologic Survey on Alcohol and Related Conditions, 66 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 152, 155
(2009) (finding in a study of over 34,653 U.S. subjects that “people with any severe mental illness”
were 2.96 times more likely to have a history of violence than the general population); Larry
Sosowsky, Crime and Violence Among Mental Patients Reconsidered in View of the New Legal
Relationship Between the State and the Mentally Ill, 135 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 33, 39 (1978) (showing
that in San Mateo County, California, mental patients were 55 times more likely to be arrested for
murder than the general population in 1973; 82.5 times more likely to be arrested for murder in 1972;
and 9 times more likely to be arrested for rape, robbery, aggravated assault, and burglary from 1972 to
1973); Larry Sosowsky, Explaining the Increased Arrest Rate Among Mental Patients: A Cautionary
Note, 137 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1602, 1602–05 (1980) (finding that mental patients with no prior arrest
record were five times more likely to be arrested for violent crimes than members of the general
population).
2
See, e.g., Patricia A. Brennan et al., Major Mental Disorders and Criminal Violence in a Danish
Birth Cohort, 57 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 494, 494–500 (2000) (examining all mental
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national studies of prisoners in the United States report that “approximately
one-quarter . . . of offenders suffer[] from mental health problems
including a history of inpatient hospitalization and psychiatric diagnoses.”3
That is more than two times the rate of mental health disorders in adults in
the general U.S. population.4
A study of Indiana murder convicts found that 18% were severely
mentally ill, and suffered from “schizophrenia or other psychotic disorder,
major depression, mania, or bipolar disorder.”5 Of these murder convicts,
5.2% were specifically diagnosed with schizophrenia,6 as compared to
1.1% of the overall adult U.S. population.7 Similarly, the Oregon
Department of Corrections recently reported that 22.8% of its offenders
either suffer from “severe” mental health problems or exhibit the “highest
need” for treatment.8
Admittedly, studies based on arrests or prison populations are likely to
suffer from sampling bias problems, as those who are mentally ill might be
arrested by the police based on assumptions of criminal tendencies.9 But
hospitalization and criminal offense records for a cohort of Danish persons born between January 1,
1944, and December 31, 1947, and finding that “[a]pproximately 2.2% of the men in the cohort were
hospitalized for a major mental disorder and committed 10% of the violent crimes committed by all the
men in the cohort; 2.6% of the women had been hospitalized for a major mental disorder and
committed 16% of the violent crimes committed by women in the cohort”); Seena Fazel et al., Bipolar
Disorder and Violent Crime: New Evidence from Population-Based Longitudinal Studies and
Systematic Review, 67 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 931, 934 (2010) (explaining that Swedish bipolar
disorder patients were 2.3 times more likely to be convicted of violent crimes than the general
population); Seena Fazel & Martin Grann, The Population Impact of Severe Mental Illness on Violent
Crime, 163 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1397, 1399–1400 (2006) (finding in a study of Swedish mental patients
that schizophrenics were 6.3 times more likely to be convicted of violent crimes than untreated persons,
and that individuals with “other psychoses” were 3.2 times more likely to be convicted of violent
crimes); Pamela J. Taylor & John Gunn, Homicides by People with Mental Illness: Myth and Reality,
174 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 9, 10 (1999) (gathering studies demonstrating that disproportionate rates of
homicide were committed by schizophrenics in multiple European countries from as early as 1900 to as
late as 1980); Cameron Wallace et al., Criminal Offending in Schizophrenia Over a 25-Year Period
Marked by Deinstitutionalization and Increasing Prevalence of Comorbid Substance Use Disorders,
161 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 716, 718 (2004) (noting that Australian schizophrenia patients were 3.2 times
more likely to have been convicted of a violent offense than persons in a control group).
3
Robert D. Morgan et al., Treating Offenders with Mental Illness: A Research Synthesis, 36 LAW
& HUM. BEHAV. 37, 37 (2012).
4
See DORIS J. JAMES & LAUREN E. GLAZE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, MENTAL HEALTH PROBLEMS
OF PRISON AND JAIL INMATES 3 (2006) (estimating that 11% of the U.S. population has a mental
disorder).
5
See Jason C. Matejkowski et al., Characteristics of Persons with Severe Mental Illness Who
Have Been Incarcerated for Murder, 36 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & LAW 74, 76 (2008) (referring to
95 persons out of a sample size of 518 persons).
6
See id. at 80 (referring to 27 persons out of a sample size of 518 persons).
7
Schizophrenia, NAT’L INST. MENTAL HEALTH, http://www.nimh.nih.gov/statistics/1schiz.shtml
(last visited Apr. 15, 2014).
8
Inmate Population Profile for 3/01/2014, OR. DEP’T CORRECTIONS, http://www.oregon.gov/doc
/RESRCH/docs/inmate_profile.pdf (last visited Mar. 18, 2014).
9
Amy C. Watson et al., Police Officers’ Attitudes Toward and Decisions About Persons with
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other studies have examined violence across society at large, with one such
study breaking down a sample of 10,059 people by diagnosis and selfreported violent behavior.10 The following table shows the total relative
violence levels for males and females in 1997:
TABLE 111

Group
No disorder
Anxiety
disorders
Major affective
disorder or
schizophrenia
Alcohol or
drug disorder

Total
Number
7871

Total
Number
Violent
148

Total %
Violent
1.88%

Relative
to No
Disorder
1.00

1444

74

5.12%

2.73

408

43

10.53%

5.60

741

157

21.18%

11.27

Of particular interest is the comparison of the severely mentally ill
(i.e., those placed in the “major affective disorder or schizophrenia” group)
to those suffering from alcohol or drug disorders. In this study, those with
alcohol or drug disorders were more likely to be violent.12 Unsurprisingly,
federal law prohibits the sale of firearms or ammunition to a person who is
“an unlawful user of or addicted to any controlled substance,”13 and further
makes it unlawful for any such person to “possess in or affecting
commerce, any firearm or ammunition.”14 Other surveys of violence rate
studies likewise suggest that the severely mentally ill are

Mental Illness, 55 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 49, 53 (2004) (concluding that police officers too often
question the credibility of persons with mental illness and often exaggerate perceptions of
dangerousness that escalate situations).
10
Jeffrey W. Swanson et al., Violence and Psychiatric Disorder in the Community: Evidence from
Epidemiologic Catchment Area Surveys, in VIOLENT BEHAVIOR & MENTAL ILLNESS: A COMPENDIUM
OF ARTICLES FROM PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES AND HOSPITAL AND COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 20, 23
(Carl C. Bell ed., 1997).
11
Id. at 25 tbl.3.
12
Swanson et al., supra note 10, at 24 tbl.2. Contrary to the popular perception that marijuana
makes users mellow and alcohol makes users violent, there was only a small difference between the
violence percentage for the “cannabis abuse or dependence” group (19.25%) and the “alcohol abuse or
dependence” group (24.57%). Both groups were markedly less violent than individuals with “other
drug abuse or dependence” (34.74%). Id.
13
18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(3) (2012).
14
Id. § 922(g)(3).
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disproportionately violent.
Some contend that those suffering only from mental illness may not be
especially violent, but that the combination of mental illness and substance
abuse poses the greatest risk.16 Yet even researchers who control for
substance abuse and conclude that the mentally ill are no more violent than
individuals without mental illness acknowledge that “[m]ental disorder has
a significant effect on violence by increasing people’s susceptibility to
substance abuse. When first discharged, patients were twice as likely as
their neighbors to be abusing substances, and alcohol and drugs raised the
risk of violence for patients abusing them even more than for others.”17
Another study showed that substance abuse disorder comorbid with
severe mental illness was an important part of the violence problem, and
further acknowledged: “Major mental disorder without alcohol or drug
abuse complications emerged as a quite rare condition in the
community.”18 At the same time, this “quite rare condition . . . was
significantly more common among persons who reported that they had
committed assaultive acts. . . . [T]he odds ratio for mental illness [alone] in
the violent group exceeded 3.5.”19 Thus, while severe mental illness alone
may not be the strongest determinant of violence, it is still a significant risk
factor by itself, as well as a reliable proxy for identifying those who have a
great risk of violence because of the high rates of comorbidity with
substance abuse.
Others argue that the connection between mental illness and violence
is illusory.20 The Interfaith Disability Advocacy Coalition (“IDAC”)
claims that “misconceptions about mental illness can cause discrimination
and unfairly hamper the recovery of the nearly 20 percent of all adult
Americans who experience a mental illness each year.”21 While there are
many Americans with mild mental illness problems, such as depression or
anxiety disorders, studies of violence and mental illness are typically
15
E.g., Frederick E. Vars & Amanda Adcock Young, Do the Mentally Ill Have a Right to Bear
Arms?, 48 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 14–16 (2013).
16
See, e.g., Elbogen & Johnson, supra note 1, at 155 (“Individuals with severe mental illness and
substance abuse and/or dependence posed a higher risk than individuals with either of these disorders
alone. The highest risk was shown for dual-disordered subjects with a history of violence, who showed
nearly 10 times higher risk of violence compared with subject with severe mental illness only.”).
17
John Monahan et al., The MacArthur Violence Risk Assessment Study Revisited: Two Views Ten
Years After Its Initial Publication, 59 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 147, 149 (2008).
18
Jeffrey W. Swanson, Mental Disorder, Substance Abuse, and Community Violence: An
Epidemiological Approach, in VIOLENCE AND MENTAL DISORDER: DEVELOPMENTS IN RISK
ASSESSMENT 101, 111 (John Monahan & Henry J. Steadman eds., 1994).
19
Id.
20
INTERFAITH DISABILITY ADVOCACY COALITION, GROUNDED IN FAITH: RESOURCES ON
MENTAL HEALTH AND GUN VIOLENCE 2–3 (2013), available at http://www.aapd.com/assets/groundedin-faith.pdf.
21
Id. at 8.

2014]

MENTAL ILLNESS AND THE SECOND AMENDMENT

1307

careful to distinguish the most severe illnesses from these less serious
problems.22 The IDAC’s claim runs contrary to the bulk of evidence
concerning prevalence of severe mental health disorders.23 It is also
apparent that the IDAC is concerned about perceived connections between
mental illness and violence causing stigmatization—in addition to being
concerned about how such connections might derail efforts toward gun
control laws aimed at the general public.24
Not all mental illnesses are severe, and at least some who are suffering
from severe mental illness are not necessarily a hazard to self or others.
Figuring this out for any particular individual requires care and discretion,
and occasionally mistakes are made in both directions, i.e., some people
who are not dangerous are hospitalized, while others who are dangerous
fail to be hospitalized. There are no perfect solutions to this. A society
must decide where to draw the line between “too strict” and “too lax”
when it comes to public safety decisions.
Other methods of examining the relationship between mental illness
and murder demonstrate that there is a statistically significant correlation
that strongly suggests a causal relationship.25 Bernard E. Harcourt’s
examination of aggregate national institutionalization rates—calculated by
adding the prison population to that of mental hospitals—and murder rates
from 1928 to 2000 found an astonishingly strong negative correlation
between the two variables: –0.78.26 As the total institutionalization rate
rose, murder rates fell, and vice versa.27 Harcourt urged that “including
mental health data in the rate of institutionalization—rather than using
prison rates only—is likely to have significant effects on the study of the
22

See supra Table 1.
While different research yields somewhat different results, attempts to reconcile prevalence
studies show that 18.5% of Americans suffer from any mental or substance abuse disorder, William E.
Narrow et al., Revised Prevalence Estimates of Mental Disorders in the United States, 59 ARCHIVES
GEN. PSYCHIATRY 115, 119 (2002), which is indeed IDAC’s “nearly 20 percent.” Most of these
disorders, however, while troubling to the sufferer, are not associated with the high violent crimes
discussed earlier. See id. at 121 tbl.4 (noting that 5.1% suffered from “[a]ny mood disorder,” which
includes bipolar disorder, and 1.0% suffered from “[s]chizophrenia/schizophreniform”). For different
methods of categorizing the severity of mental illnesses, see Ronald C. Kessler et al., Prevalence,
Severity, and Comorbidity of 12-Month DSM-IV Disorders in the National Comorbidity Survey
Replication, 62 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 617, 619 (2005) (finding in a study of 9282 respondents
that 2432 (26.2%) had a disorder meeting the criteria for a twelve-month DSM mental disorder and
that, among those with a disorder, 542 (22.3%) were classified as “serious”).
24
INTERFAITH DISABILITY ADVOCACY COALITION, supra note 20, at 2, 4–6.
25
The ninety-five percent confidence interval is commonly used as a first test of whether a
relationship between variables might indicate a causal connection. WARREN S. BROWNER, PUBLISHING
AND PRESENTING CLINICAL RESEARCH 60–61 (2d ed. 2006).
26
Bernard E. Harcourt, From the Asylum to the Prison: Rethinking the Incarceration Revolution,
84 TEX. L. REV. 1751, 1766 (2006).
27
See id. at 1765 (describing the aggregated institutionalized rate as an inverted plot of the
homicide trend line).
23
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relationship between confinement and crime during the twentieth
century.”28 Even when he adjusted for changes in unemployment and the
fluctuating fraction of the population that was at peak violent crime age,
the negative correlation remained strong and better predicted both the
1960s rise and the 1990s decline in murder rates than the other models
traditionally used by criminologists.29 In a follow-up study, where
Harcourt used state-level data for institutionalization and murder rates and
controlled for even more variables, the statistically significant negative
correlation remained for forty-four states.30 A few states—such as
Florida—showed no significant correlation between institutionalization
rates and murder rates.31
Another study came to similar conclusions about the relationship
between murder rates and mental illness. Steven P. Segal of the University
of California at Berkeley’s School of Social Welfare studied state-to-state
variations in 2004 murder rates and mental health care, while controlling
for firearms restrictions and socioeconomic, demographic, and geographic
data.32 He found that less access to psychiatric inpatient beds and poorly
rated mental health systems were respectively associated with increases in
the homicide rates by 1.08 and 0.26 per 100,000 people.33 Since the
national average homicide rate was 5.9 per 100,000 people in 2004,34
greater access to inpatient beds is clearly quite important in reducing
homicide rates; poorly rated mental health systems also matter, just less
dramatically. Segal also found interesting differences based on variations
in involuntary civil commitment (“ICC”) laws. Broader ICC-criteria were
associated with 1.42 fewer homicides per 100,000 people, which was a bit
less than one-quarter of the national homicide rate.35 In short, states where
involuntary commitment of the mentally ill was relatively easy had
significantly fewer murders than states where it was more difficult.36
28

Id. at 1773.
Id. at 1767, 1771.
30
Bernard E. Harcourt, From the Asylum to the Prison: Rethinking the Incarceration Revolution
Part II: State Level Analysis 48 (Univ. of Chi. Law Sch., John M. Olin Law & Econ. Working Paper
No. 335, 2007), available at http://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/files/335.pdf.
31
Id. at 43.
32
Steven P. Segal, Civil Commitment Law, Mental Health Services, and U.S. Homicide Rates, 47
SOC. PSYCHIATRY & PSYCHIATRIC EPIDEMIOLOGY 1449, 1449–50 (2012).
33
Id. at 1449.
34
Underlying Cause of Death, 1999–2010 Request, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION, http://wonder.cdc.gov/ucd-icd10.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2014) (group results by
“ICD-10 113 Cause List”; select year “2004”; then, under ICD-10 codes, open “V01-Y89”; then select
“X85-Y09”; then click “send”). In 2010, the most recent year for which data is available, the homicide
rate was 5.2 per 100,000 people. Id. (group results by “ICD-10 113 Cause List”; select year “2010”;
then, under ICD-10 codes, open “V01-Y89”; then select “X85-Y09”; then click “send”).
35
Segal, supra note 32, at 1455–56.
36
See id. at 1457 (finding a need for criteria facilitating early preventative intervention for people
with serious mental illness).
29
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The remainder of this Article proceeds in nine parts. Part II further
sets forth the connection between mental illness and violence, and
discusses the public’s perception of mass murders. Parts III and IV lay out
the history and current state of mental illness-related firearms regulation.
Parts V and VI describe the deinstitutionalization movement and its
consequences for both the mentally ill and the public. Part VII assesses
whether, in current or historical context, there is a conflict between the
rights of the mentally ill and the Second Amendment. Part VIII examines
serious due process concerns raised by some current mental health-related
regulations. Part IX concludes that reversing deinstitutionalization while
ensuring that mental hospitals are humane places will serve both the
mentally ill and prevent a significant amount of public violence.
II. MENTAL ILLNESS AND MURDER IN CONTEMPORARY NEWS HEADLINES
The empirical studies present persuasive evidence that there is a
connection between severe mental illness and violence. While most
severely mentally ill people are not dangerous, the popular perception of
such a connection is not simply prejudice, but represents a very real
difference between the severely mentally ill and the general population.
A. A Bridge Between Empirical Studies and Public Consciousness
The results of the empirical studies mentioned above should not take
us by surprise as a society, particularly in light of the tremendous media
attention given to murders committed by the severely mentally ill.
Consider, for example, the Indiana study that indicated schizophrenics—
whose symptoms include hallucinations and delusions—were
overrepresented among murderers.37 In 2008, a schizophrenic named
Vince Li beheaded and cannibalized a fellow bus passenger in Manitoba
because he believed that he was “the second coming of Jesus” and his
mission was to save the Earth from extraterrestrial invasion.38 Similarly,
Russell Eugene Weston, Jr. explained to a court-appointed psychiatrist that
he shot two U.S. Capitol Police officers to death in 1999 to prevent the
spread of a disease by cannibals.39 Like many of the schizophrenics who
make local, national, or even international headlines, Weston had a long
history of mental illness well known to family, mental health workers, and
37
See supra notes 6–7 and accompanying text; see also Peter F. Liddle, The Symptoms of Chronic
Schizophrenia: A Re-examination of the Positive-Negative Dichotomy, 151 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 145,
147 (1987) (discussing the division of general symptoms of schizophrenia).
38
Greyhound Killer Believed Man He Beheaded Was an Alien, CBC NEWS (May 22, 2012),
http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/manitoba/greyhound-killer-believed-man-he-beheaded-was-an-alien1.1131575.
39
Bill Miller, Capitol Shooter’s Mind-Set Detailed, WASH. POST (Apr. 23, 1999),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/national/longterm/shooting/stories/weston042399.htm.
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police, but had not been hospitalized for any great length of time.
In 2000, the New York Times studied one hundred “rampage” killers in
the United States.41 The study found there was often plenty of advance
warning related to mental illness:
Most of them left a road map of red flags, spending months
plotting their attacks and accumulating weapons, talking
openly of their plans for bloodshed. Many showed signs of
serious mental health problems. The Times’ study found that
many of the rampage killers . . . suffered from severe
psychosis, were known by people in their circles as being
noticeably ill and needing help, and received insufficient or
inconsistent treatment from a mental health system that
seemed incapable of helping these especially intractable
patients.42
Of the one hundred murderers studied, forty-seven “had a history of mental
health problems” before committing murder, twenty had been previously
hospitalized for mental illness, and forty-two had been previously seen by
professionals for their mental illness.43 It is possible that many of the fiftythree who did not have a history of mental health problems were also
mentally ill. The lack of mental illness history for those fifty-three may be
the result of an absence of evidence, and not necessarily evidence of
absence. For example, some of the individuals simply may not have come
to the attention of law enforcement or mental health professionals. While
family and friends are often aware of serious mental illness problems
earlier than professionals, mentally ill persons sometimes estrange
themselves from family and friends, making it more difficult for a forensic
evaluation to locate evidence of mental illness.
B. High-Profile Mass Murders Linked to Mental Illness Since 2000
Since 2000, multiple mass murders have anecdotally confirmed what
the New York Times found: people that commit random acts of mass
murder are usually suffering from severe mental illness. In 2003, an
employee of the Postal Service, Jennifer San Marco, was removed from
her Goleta, California, workplace because she was acting strangely and

40
See Clayton E. Cramer, Madness, Deinstitutionalization & Murder, 13 ENGAGE 37, 37–40
(2012), available at http://www.fed-soc.org/publications/detail/madness-deinstitutionalization-murder
(detailing a list of murders by the mentally ill).
41
Laurie Goodstein & William Glaberson, The Well-Marked Roads to Homicidal Rage, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 10, 2000, at A1.
42
Id.
43
Id.
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then placed on psychological disability.
San Marco moved to Milan,
New Mexico, where neighbors said she “shouted furiously to herself,”
“knelt in prayer at the roadside,” and “peeled off her clothes in random
parking lots.”45 One neighbor who had worked in mental health clinics for
eighteen years reportedly called the police in hopes that San Marco would
receive a mental health evaluation, but the police stated they lacked a
record of the call.46 San Marco returned to the Goleta mail sorting facility
in January 2006 and murdered five employees before taking her own life.47
She purchased the guns and ammunition used in the shooting from two
New Mexico pawn shops—following clearance of a background check.48
In April 2007, Seung-Hui Cho murdered thirty-two students and
faculty at Virginia Tech before taking his own life.49 Some of Cho’s
professors had previously noticed that something was not right with him,
including the English department’s chairman who reported to “campus
police and administrators . . . her worries about Cho’s antisocial behavior
and disturbingly violent writing.”50 In 2005, Cho was detained by campus
police following stalking incidents and a report that he seemed suicidal.51
Thereafter, a special judge considered whether Cho should be involuntarily
committed and concluded that he was an imminent danger to himself and
others.52 Cho was taken to a hospital and received a court-ordered medical
examination, but he denied having suicidal thoughts or other concerning
symptoms.53 Cho was deemed free to leave the hospital and went back to
live on campus in a world of paranoid schizophrenia.54 Because he was
not involuntarily committed to a hospital, Cho’s name did not appear on
the FBI’s firearms background checklist, and he was able to purchase
handguns that he used in the largest firearm mass murder in U.S. history.55
44
Martin Kasindorf, Woman Kills 5, Self at Postal Plant, USA TODAY (Feb. 1, 2006),
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/2006-01-31-postal-shooting_x.htm.
45
Dan Frosch, Woman in California Postal Shootings Had History of Bizarre Behavior, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 3, 2006, at A19.
46
Id.
47
Kasindorf, supra note 44.
48
Associated Press, Postal Killer Believed She Was Target of a Plot, NBC NEWS (Feb. 3, 2006),
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/11167920/ns/us_news-crime_and_courts/t/postal-killer-believed-she-wastarget-plot/#.U4S4-f3Fkds.
49
Nancy Shute, What Went Wrong?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Apr. 30, 2007, at 42.
50
Id.
51
Id.
52
Id.
53
Id.
54
Id.; see Michael Welner, Cho Likely Schizophrenic, Evidence Suggests,
ABC NEWS (Apr. 17, 2007), http://abcnews.go.com/Health/VATech/cho-schizophrenic-evidencesuggests/story?id=3050483&singlePage=true (reporting that a forensic psychiatrist “believe[d] the
evidence strongly supports that Cho had paranoid schizophrenia”).
55
Josh Horwitz, Expanding Background Checks Necessary, but Not Enough,
HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 7, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/josh-horwitz/expanding-
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In April 2009, Jiverly Wong murdered thirteen people at a
Binghamton, New York, immigrant assistance center before also killing
himself.56 Letters from Wong to local news media demonstrated what Dr.
Vatsal Thakkar, assistant professor of psychiatry at New York University’s
Langone Medical Center, described as “major mental illness, quite
possibly paranoid schizophrenia.”57
In January 2011, Jared Lee Loughner opened fire on a crowd at a
public meet-and-greet with Congresswoman Gabrielle Giffords and her
constituents, killing six and injuring thirteen.58 Loughner had a history of
incidents with police and was expelled from college for bizarre actions.59
Despite his frightening behavior, he apparently was never hospitalized—
even for observation—until he made himself nationally infamous.60 A
series of disturbing web postings and YouTube videos also confirm that
Loughner’s grasp on reality was severely impaired.61 Court-ordered
psychiatric evaluations concluded that Loughner suffered from
schizophrenia and was incompetent to stand trial.62 Eventually, he was
well enough to stand trial and pleaded guilty to avoid the death penalty.63
background-chec_b_4554161.html; Editorial, Close the Loophole Cho Sneaked Through, VIRGINIANPILOT (Apr. 25, 2007), http://hamptonroads.com/node/255931.
56
Austin Fenner et al., “I Am Shooting—Have a Nice Day”—Shocking Letter Reveals Spree
Killer’s Paranoia, N.Y. POST, Apr. 7, 2009, at 7.
57
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
58
Jacques Billeaud, Loughner Pleads Not Guilty, TULSA WORLD, Jan. 25, 2011, at A5.
59
Brian Skoloff & Jacques Billeaud, Arizona Shooting Suspect Spiraled into Madness, GAZETTE
(Montreal, Can.), Mar. 28, 2013, at A14; Tim Steller, Man Linked to Giffords Shooting Called “Very
Disturbed,” ARIZ. DAILY STAR (Jan. 8, 2011), http://azstarnet.com/news/local/crime/man-linked-togiffords-shooting-rampage-called-very-disturbed/article_91db5db4-1b74-11e0-ba23001cc4c002e0.html.
60
See Tim Steller, Sr. Reporter: Tucson Hospital Says Loughner Wasn’t a Patient, ARIZ. DAILY
STAR (May 9, 2011, 10:00 AM), http://azstarnet.com/news/blogs/senor-reporter/sr-reporter-tucsonhospital-says-loughner-wasn-t-a-patient/article_050f92b2-7a68-11e0-b623-001cc4c03286.html (noting,
contrary to previous reports, that no prior records existed of Loughner being hospitalized for his mental
health problems); College Asked ATF About Loughner Before Rampage, CBS NEWS (May 20,
2011) http://www.cbsnews.com/news/college-asked-atf-about-loughner-before-rampage/ (noting that
Loughner’s college administrators ordered him to get a mental health evaluation before returning to
campus and described his behavior as “bizarre” and “intimidating”).
61
David A. Fahrenthold & Clarence Williams, Tucson Shooting Suspect Jared Loughner Appears
to Have Posted Bizarre Messages, WASH. POST (Jan. 9, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2011/01/08/AR2011010803961.html. Loughner “left a series of postings and
homemade videos that laid out a fervent, though largely incoherent, set of political views.” Id. In one
of his YouTube videos, Loughner stated: “I can’t trust the current government because of the
ratifications: the government is implying mind control and brainwash on the people by controlling
grammar.” Id. Some of Loughner’s videos are still available on the Internet. Classitup10,
Introduction: Jared Loughner, YOUTUBE (Dec. 15, 2010), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nHoaaLb
qB4.
62
Craig Harris & Michael Kiefer, Judge Finds Jared Loughner Incompetent to Stand Trial,
AZCENTRAL (May 25, 2011), http://www.azcentral.com/news/articles/2011/05/25/20110525gabrielgiffords-shot-jared-loughner-competncy-hearing.html.
63
Michael Martinez & Kyung Lah, Loughner Pleads Guilty to 19 Counts in Tucson, Arizona,
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James Holmes, a neurosciences graduate student at the University of
Colorado, open fired in a movie theater on the night of July 20, 2012,
killing twelve and injuring fifty-eight others.64 Holmes’s problems were
serious enough for his psychiatrist at the medical school, Dr. Lynne
Fenton, to break doctor-patient confidentiality and alert the police, who
took no action.65 Because Dr. Fenton broke doctor-patient confidentiality
to contact the police, it is reasonable to assume that Holmes
“communicated to [her] a serious threat of imminent physical violence
against a specific person or persons.”66 This exception to doctor-patient
confidentiality outlines the only way Dr. Fenton could disclose Holmes’s
threat to law enforcement, and yet the police’s failure to commit Holmes to
a seventy-two-hour treatment and evaluation period suggests that they
believed he was not “an imminent danger to others.”67
Certainly, the most disturbing of these recent mass murders occurred in
December 2012 in Newtown, Connecticut. Adam Lanza had some sort of
psychiatric disorder, but his childhood diagnosis of Asperger’s Syndrome68
is not typically associated with violent crime.69 Some reports describe
Lanza as suffering from sensory integration disorder (“SID”), where
sensory inputs overwhelm the brain.70 There is sizable overlap between
the description of SID and the sensory problems that appear to be part of
schizophrenia71—enough to wonder if Lanza was edging into
Mass Shooting, CNN (Aug. 8, 2012), http://www.cnn.com/2012/08/07/us/arizona-loughner-plea/.
64
Colo. Shooting Suspect James Holmes’ Lawyers: He’s Mentally Ill, CBS NEWS (Aug. 9, 2012),
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/colo-shooting-suspect-james-holmes-lawyers-hes-mentally-ill/.
65
Id.
66
COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-117 (2013).
67
Id. § 27-65-105.
68
Alice Park, Don’t Blame Adam Lanza’s Violence on Asperger’s, TIME (Mar. 11, 2011),
http://time.com/19957/adam-lanzas-violence-wasnt-typical-of-aspergers/.
69
See Daniel C. Murrie et al., Asperger’s Syndrome in Forensic Settings, 1 INT ’ L J. FORENSIC
M ENTAL HEALTH 59, 61 (2002) (noting the existence of an intense debate about “whether Asperger’s
patients are truly more prone to violence,” but observing that the vast majority of those diagnosed do
not commit violent crimes); Press Release, Interagency Autism Coordinating Comm., Statement of the
Interagency
Autism
Coordinating
Committee
(IACC)
Related
to
the
Sandy
Hook Tragedy (Dec. 21, 2012), available at http://iacc.hhs.gov/news/press_releases/2012/iacc_sandy_h
ook_statement_122112.pdf (“There is no scientific evidence linking [autism spectrum disorder] with
homicides or other violent crimes.”). But see Barbara G. Haskins & J. Arturo Silva, Asperger’s
Disorder and Criminal Behavior: Forensic-Psychiatric Considerations, 34 J. AM. ACAD .
PSYCHIATRY & L. 374, 378 (2006) (“Violent behavior among children, adolescents, and even adults
with [Asperger’s] is not uncommon.”).
70
Adam Clark Estes, Revelations About Adam Lanza’s Mental Health Still Don’t Explain the
Violence, THE WIRE (Feb. 19, 2013), http://www.thewire.com/national/2013/02/revelations-aboutadam-lanzas-mental-health-still-dont-explain-violence/62317/.
71
See Peter Falkai et al., Pathophysiology of Schizophrenia, in SCHIZOPHRENIA: CURRENT
SCIENCE AND CLINICAL PRACTICE 31, 42 (Wolfgang Gaebel ed., 2011) (discussing “dysfunction “of
the cortico-cerebellar-thalamic-cortical neuronal circuit” and its role in filtering sensory information);
Anthony J. Rissling & Gregory A. Light, Neurophysiological Measures of Sensory Registration,
Stimulus Discrimination, and Selection in Schizophrenia Patients 284–46, in BEHAVIORAL
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schizophrenia or if Lanza’s psychiatrist was reluctant to diagnose this
devastating illness until he was certain of it. Early reports indicated that
Lanza’s mother was attempting to have him hospitalized and this may have
provoked the crime.72
Americans have recently mourned yet another tragedy at the Navy
Yard in Washington, D.C., where Aaron Alexis murdered twelve people
before dying in a gun battle with police on September 16, 2013.73 In the
months before, Alexis had given increasingly clear signs of serious mental
illness, including paranoia, sleep disorders, and “hearing voices” in his
head.74
These highly publicized incidents only represent a few of the mass
murders committed in the United States by persons with signs of severe
mental illness. A comprehensive accounting of such tragedies since 2000
would be dozens of pages long. During this same period, even larger mass
murders have been committed by the mentally ill in other countries, such
as Norwegian Anders Behring Breivik, who murdered 77 people and
wounded 242.75
C. The Question of Foreseeability: Why These Mass Murders Are
Considered Disproportionately Important to Public Policy
Relative to the overall murder rate in the United States, murders
committed by the mentally ill amount to a small fraction, and the public
mass murders that receive so much media attention are an especially tiny
NEUROBIOLOGY OF SCHIZOPHRENIA AND ITS TREATMENT 283, 284–86 (Neal R. Swerdlow, ed., 2010)
(discussing the relationship between sensory input processing and schizophrenia); see also Andrew
Solomon, The Reckoning: The Father of Sandy Hook Killer Searches for Answers, NEW YORKER (Mar.
17, 2014), http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2014/03/17/140317fa_fact_solomon?currentPage=all
(noting that Adam Lanza’s father now suspects that his son’s Asperger’s Syndrome may have “veiled”
or “mask[ed]” schizophrenia).
72
Jana Winter, Fear of Being Committed May Have Caused Connecticut Gunman to Snap, FOX
NEWS (Dec. 18, 2012), http://www.foxnews.com/us/2012/12/18/fear-being-committed-may-havecaused-connecticut-madman-to-snap/ (reporting that Adam Lanza found out about his mother
“petitioning the court for conservatorship and (her) plans to have him committed,” and that “[a] senior
law enforcement official involved in the [Sandy Hook] investigation confirmed that Lanza’s anger at
his mother over plans for ‘his future mental health treatment’ [was] being looked at as a possible
motive”).
73
Ashley Halsey III & Peter Hermann, Day of Deaths and Dread in the Nation’s Capital, BOS.
GLOBE, Sept. 17, 2013, at A1.
74
Erica Goode et al., Signs of Distress Multiplied on Killer’s Path to Navy Yard, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 20, 2013, at A1; see also Brigid Schulte et al., Chances to Intervene in Navy Yard Shooter’s
Problems Missed for Years by Various Groups, WASH. POST, Sept. 22, 2013, at A1 (describing law
enforcement accounts from Veterans Administration sources concerning Alexis’s treatment).
75
Mark
Townsend,
Breivik Verdict: Norwegian Extremist Declared Sane
and Sentenced to 21 Years, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 24, 2012), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/
aug/24/breivik-verdict-sane-21-years. Breivik was found legally sane at trial, although determined to
be schizophrenic by court-appointed psychiatrists.
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portion. Over the past thirty years, “incidents in which four or more
people were killed at random by a gunman killing indiscriminately” make
up “less than a tenth of 1 percent” of all murders.76 Only one aspect of the
mass murders renders them disproportionately important to public policy
making: the question of foreseeability. Many murderers have some
relationship to the victim. Of situations where the relationship between
victim and murderer is known, only twenty-one percent of victims are
strangers to their murderer.77 This allows members of the general public to
believe, with some cause, that it is possible to avoid being a victim by
picking one’s friends with care or by avoiding “bad” neighborhoods.
Mass murders, defined as killings with multiple victims in a single
place or across multiple locations during a brief period of time, often
involve attacks on complete strangers by severely mentally ill killers.78
The locations of these mass murders are not normally considered high-risk
locations, as they include shopping malls, schools, and churches. The
popular perception that you cannot avoid these tragedies creates a level of
fear disproportionate to the actual risk, sometimes provoking panicked
legislative actions.
III. A HISTORY OF MENTAL ILLNESS-RELATED FIREARMS REGULATION
Surprisingly enough, attempts to regulate firearms possession by the
mentally ill (except within the bounds of a mental hospital) appear to be
quite recent. George L. Harrison’s Legislation On Insanity provides a
comprehensive collection of nineteenth-century laws concerning the
commitment, operation, and funding of state and territorial mental
hospitals.79 The words arms, firearms, weapon, pistol, revolver, handgun,
rifle, and shotgun appear nowhere within its 1119 pages. Similarly, Henry
F. Buswell’s The Law of Insanity in Its Application to the Civil Rights and
Capacities and Criminal Responsibility of the Citizen, a comprehensive
work on the law of insanity from the same period, contains no discussion
of regulation of arms by those who had been found mentally incompetent
by the courts.80
76
Annie Linskey, Mass Shootings Fuel Fear, Account for Fraction of Murders, BLOOMBERG
(Sept. 16, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-09-17/mass-shootings-fuel-fear-account-forfraction-of-murders.html.
77
See Crime in the United States 2011: Expanded Homicide Data Table 10,
FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2011/crime-inthe-u.s.-2011/tables/expanded-homicide-data-table-10 (last visited Mar. 16, 2014) (indicating that of
the 12,664 total murder victims in 2011, 5558 had an unknown relationship with their murderer and
1481 were strangers to their murderer).
78
DAVID LESTER, MASS MURDER: THE SCOURGE OF THE 21ST CENTURY 11 (2004).
79
GEORGE L. HARRISON, LEGISLATION ON INSANITY: A COLLECTION OF ALL THE LUNACY LAWS
OF THE STATES AND TERRITORIES OF THE UNITED STATES (Phila., Globe 1884).
80
HENRY F. BUSWELL, THE LAW OF INSANITY IN ITS APPLICATION TO THE CIVIL RIGHTS AND

1316

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:1301

The earliest state law on the subject that I could find is a 1957
California statute prohibiting any “mental patient in any hospital or
institution or on parole from any hospital or institution” from possessing a
firearm.81 Other restrictive state laws appeared in the 1960s, such as New
Jersey in 196682 and Illinois in 1967;83 news accounts suggest that
previously there were only local ordinances in effect, and the state laws
appear to be the first of their kind.84 Some of these early laws, such as
South Carolina’s 1965 statute, relied on sellers to determine whether the
buyer was “mentally competent.”85 This would be a difficult task for a
person not trained in medicine or psychiatry to perform while completing a
transaction that otherwise might take only a few minutes. One must
assume that only the most obvious cases of psychosis and senility would be
noticed and rejected by a seller.
Appearing earlier than any of the state laws is the District of
Columbia’s 1932 Dangerous Weapons Act, which for the first time in
many decades prohibited open carry of a firearm without a license.86 This
law prohibited sales to anyone whom the seller “ha[d] reasonable cause to
believe is not of sound mind.”87 The law seems functionally defective
because there was nothing in the statute that prohibited those “not of sound
mind” from possessing a firearm that was acquired outside of the District
or obtained within the District by means other than a purchase.88
CAPACITIES AND CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY OF THE CITIZEN (Bos., Little Brown 1885).
81
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5670 (1957) (current version at CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 8100
(West 2013)).
82
See 1966 N.J. Laws 484 (making a firearms seller guilty of a misdemeanor “where the seller
has reason to believe the person is of unsound mind”).
83
See 1967 Ill. Laws 2599–600 (“A person commits the offense of unlawful sale of firearms
when he knowingly . . . [s]ells or gives any firearm to any person who has been a patient in a mental
hospital within the past 5 years . . . .”).
84
See Katzenbach Lauds N.J. Gun Bill, SUNDAY TIMES ADVERTISER (Trenton, N.J.), June 5,
1966, at 1, 7 (reporting that New Jersey’s “pioneering law” was the “nation’s most comprehensive gun
control”); Stop, Frisk Bill Vetoed by Kerner, ROCKFORD REG.-REPUBLIC (Rockford, Ill.), Aug. 4, 1967,
at B1 (quoting Illinois’s governor as saying its new law was a “strong beginning”); see also Gun
Control Campaign Meets Ardent Foes, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, June 23, 1968, at 11A (reporting
that on April 15, 1968, Chicago adopted a slightly more restrictive firearm registration law than Illinois
that prohibited ownership by “the mentally ill”).
85
S.C. CODE ANN. § 54-578 (1965); see also Marc Anderson, State’s Gun Law Called Worthless,
AUGUSTA CHRON. (Augusta, Ga.), Dec. 1, 1967, at 1 (stating, with respect to a state law, “We cannot
hope for a pawn shop owner to judge whether a man who buys a gun is mentally competent or a
felon”).
86
D.C. CODE § 116d (Supp. V 1939). Cooke v. United States explains the legislative history of
this section’s predecessors. 275 F.2d 887, 889 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1960). In 1871, a law in the District
prohibited the carrying of deadly weapons. Id. “The statute was amended after the turn of the century
to make it unlawful to conceal a gun about one’s person or to carry it openly with the intent to use it
unlawfully.” Id. (emphasis added).
87
D.C. CODE § 116g.
88
It is an interesting question whether this measure passed entirely or even primarily for the
purpose of crime control. Its date of passage, July 8, 1932, is twenty days before District police started
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While we can assume that the police would have used existing records
to determine whether a person might be “not of sound mind,” there seems
to be no statutory definition of this term. Would it require involuntary
commitment to a mental hospital, a diagnosis of dementia, or something
else? A search of D.C. Circuit cases in the period between 1930 and 1940
for the term “sound mind” is more mysterious than informative, and
largely yields decisions relating to trusts and estates law.89 The closest that
these decisions come to a useful definition is tautological: “laymen may
testify to sanity or insanity, since ‘the appearance and conduct of insane
persons, as contrasted with the appearance and conduct of persons of sound
mind, are more or less understood and recognized by every one of ordinary
intelligence.’”90
Of course, pistol-licensing measures, such as New York’s Sullivan
Law of 1911, likely had the effect of disarming the severely mentally ill
because they provided unlimited discretion to a judge as to whether to
allow an individual to possess a handgun.91 A few accidental peeks inside
the results of the Sullivan Law process in the 1920s and 1950s suggest that
there may have been political dimensions to the permit issuance process, at
eviction of the “Bonus Expeditionary Force,” a group of ten thousand veterans who “had ‘occupied’ the
capital since early June” to pressure Congress to grant early payment of a bonus due to them for their
World War I service. HERBERT HOOVER AND WORLD PEACE 126 (Lee Nash ed., 2010). Significantly,
another law passed the same day as, and immediately following, the Dangerous Weapons Act, which
provided for lending money to “any honorably discharged veteran of the World War, temporarily
quartered in the District of Columbia” to return home, as long as they did so “prior to July 15, 1932.”
H.R.J. Res. 462, 72nd Cong., 47 Stat. 654 (1932). Perhaps this was all coincidence, but perhaps there
was a desire to have a method to disarm or prosecute armed members of the Bonus Expeditionary
Force.
89
See, e.g., Ecker v. Potts, 112 F.2d 581, 581 (D.C. Cir. 1940) (noting appellant’s argument that
the testatrix was not of “sound mind”); McDonald v. Fulton Trust Co., 107 F.2d 237, 238 (D.C. Cir.
1939) (noting the division of courts on the issue of whether a trust will be terminated “when some of its
purposes are not yet fulfilled, but all the beneficiaries are of full age and sound mind”); Thompson v.
Smith, 103 F.2d 936, 939 (D.C. Cir. 1939) (noting testimony that the decedent was “of sound mind”);
Werner v. Frederick, 94 F.2d 627, 628 (D.C. Cir. 1937) (noting the plaintiffs’ assertion that the
decedent was not “of sound mind” at the time a will was executed); Owens v. United States, 85 F.2d
270, 271 (D.C. Cir. 1936) (noting that the jury returned a verdict finding the defendant to be of “sound
mind”); Am. Sec. & Trust Co. v. ex rel. Spencer, 82 F.2d 456, 456 (D.C. Cir. 1936) (quoting a portion
of the decedent’s will where she stated she was “of sound mind”); Railey v. Railey, 30 F. Supp. 121,
122 (D.D.C. 1939) (noting the defendant’s argument that the decedent was of “sound mind”).
90
United States v. Witbeck, 113 F.2d 185, 187 (D.C. Cir. 1940) (quoting Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co.
v. Lathrop, 111 U.S. 612, 619 (1884)).
91
1911 N.Y. Laws ch. 195, sec. 1, § 1897 (current version at N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 265.01(1),
265.20(a)(3) (McKinney 2013)). A contributing factor to the passage of the Sullivan Law was the
murder of David Graham Phillips, a socially and politically connected author, in New York City by
Fitzhugh Coyle Goldsborough, a musician and poet suffering from mental illness. Peter Duffy, 100
Years Ago, the Shot That Spurred New York’s Gun-Control Law, CITY ROOM (Jan. 23, 2011),
http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/01/23/100-years-ago-the-shot-that-spurred-new-yorks-guncontrol-law/; see also Phillips Dies of His Wounds, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 1911, at A1 (announcing
Phillips’s death).
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least at the beginning. Known Mafiosi were successfully receiving not just
permits to possess pistols in their homes, but the much more difficult pistol
carry permits.92 We can only hope that New York State judges have been
more concerned about mentally ill persons with firearms than Mafiosi with
firearms.
Given the increased concern from the 1960s onward regarding the
possession of firearms by the mentally ill, it is especially interesting to
consider the relationship between violent crime and mental illness before
that period of deinstitutionalization. Certainly in the early days of the state
mental hospital system, the potential for the mentally ill to commit crimes
of violence was widely understood. When Massachusetts opened
Worcester Hospital in the early nineteenth century, the law limited its
admissions to “the violent and furious.”93 Dr. Samuel B. Woodward,
Worcester Hospital’s first superintendent, noted, “More than half of those
manifesting monomania and melancholia are said to exhibit a propensity to
homicide or suicide.”94 Accounts of mass murder—usually involving
family members—appear often enough in this period to understand why
insanity could lead to hospitalization.95 The opening of state asylums in
92
See JAY S. ALBANESE, ORGANIZED CRIME IN OUR TIMES 141–42 (2011) (reviewing the 1957
Appalachian, New York, Mafia leadership meeting that police accidentally discovered); EDWARD
BEHR, PROHIBITION: THIRTEEN YEARS THAT CHANGED AMERICA 240–41 (1996) (stating that many of
the Mafiosi had pistol carry permits issued by New York and New Jersey authorities); DAVID
CRITCHLEY, THE ORIGIN OF ORGANIZED CRIME IN AMERICA: THE NEW YORK CITY MAFIA, 1891–
1931, at 285 n.81 (2009) (describing how a New York mafia member used someone else’s address to
obtain a pistol permit); SID FEDER & JOACHIM JOESTEN, THE LUCIANO STORY 52–54 (1954) (providing
examples of 1920s Mafiosi receiving pistol carry permits); THOMAS A. REPPETTO, AMERICAN MAFIA:
A HISTORY OF ITS RISE TO POWER 105 (2004) (noting that a New York mafia member was able to
produce “a pistol permit signed by a state supreme court justice” when stopped by the police).
93
HERBERT GOLDHAMER & ANDREW W. MARSHALL, PSYCHOSIS AND CIVILIZATION: TWO
STUDIES IN THE FREQUENCY OF MENTAL DISEASE 39 (1953).
94
Id. at 40–41. In modern terminology, the disorders mentioned are the rough equivalents of
schizophrenia and depression, respectively. The term “monomania” was used for a variety of
psychiatric conditions in the nineteenth century, leading to criticisms that it should perhaps be
narrowed in its meaning. See R.L. Parsons, Nomenclature of Psychiatry, 56 MED. & SURGICAL REP.
718 (1887) (“Monomania had been employed to indicate many different conditions of mental
disease . . . . [at least one doctor] had come to use the term paranoia as a substitute for that of
monomania with satisfaction . . . .”).
95
See, e.g., JAMES W. NORTH, THE HISTORY OF AUGUSTA, FROM THE EARLIEST SETTLEMENT TO
THE PRESENT TIME 335–37 (1870) (providing detailed accounts of the 1806 Purrinton murders, in
which James Purrinton used a knife to murder his wife and seven of his eight children before
committing suicide); LAUREL THATCHER ULRICH, A MIDWIFE’S TALE: THE LIFE OF MARTHA
BALLARD, BASED ON HER DIARY, 1785–1812, at 291–306 (1991) (same). The case of William Beadle,
of Wethersfield, Connecticut, is disturbingly similar. ROYAL RALPH HINMAN, A CATALOGUE OF THE
NAMES OF THE EARLY PURITAN SETTLERS OF THE COLONY OF CONNECTICUT 165–67 (1852). In 1782,
Beadle murdered his wife and four children by knocking them unconscious with an ax, then slitting
their throats. Id. at 166. He then killed himself by firing two pistols at his head, simultaneously. Id.
Beadle’s alleged motive was to protect them from ensuing poverty, his capital having been destroyed
by the Revolution. GEORGE SIMON ROBERTS, HISTORIC TOWNS OF THE CONNECTICUT RIVER VALLEY
153–55 (1906).
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Vermont in 1836 and New Hampshire in 1840 “contributed to the decline
in such spouse and family murders during the 1850s and 1860s.”96
During the period before deinstitutionalization, the mentally ill seem to
have been less likely to be arrested for crimes than the general population.
Studies in New York and Connecticut from the 1920s through the 1940s
showed a much lower arrest rate for the mentally ill.97 This is no surprise;
those who were severely mentally ill were much more likely to be
hospitalized before they became dangerously violent.98
IV. CURRENT MENTAL ILLNESS-RELATED FIREARMS REGULATION
A. The Federal Regulatory Scheme
The Gun Control Act of 196899 makes firearms possession unlawful
for anyone “adjudicated as a mental defective” or who has been
“committed to a mental institution.”100 Federal regulation further defines
these terms:
Adjudicated as a mental defective. (a) A determination by a
court, board, commission, or other lawful authority that a
person, as a result of marked subnormal intelligence, or
mental illness, incompetency, condition, or disease:
(1) Is a danger to himself or to others; or
(2) Lacks the mental capacity to contract or manage his
own affairs.
(b) The term shall include—
(1) A finding of insanity by a court in a criminal case; and
(2) Those persons found incompetent to stand trial or
found not guilty by reason of lack of mental responsibility
pursuant to articles 50a and 72b of the Uniform Code of
Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. 850a, 876b.
....
96
Randolph A. Roth, Spousal Murder in Northern New England, 1776–1865, in OVER THE
THRESHOLD: INTIMATE VIOLENCE IN EARLY AMERICA 65, 72 (Christine Daniels & Michael V.
Kennedy eds., 1999).
97
PHIL BROWN, THE TRANSFER OF CARE: PSYCHIATRIC DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION AND ITS
AFTERMATH 133 (1985); cf. Thomas M. Arvanites, The Mental Health and Criminal Justice Systems:
Complementary Forms of Coercive Control, in SOCIAL THREAT AND SOCIAL CONTROL 131, 139 (Allen
A. Liska ed., 1992) (“[E]vidence that suggests that the mentally ill are being arrested more often since
deinstitutionalization.”).
98
BROWN, supra note 97, at 140.
99
18 U.S.C. §§ 921–28 (2012).
100
Id. § 922.
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Committed to a mental institution. A formal commitment of
a person to a mental institution by a court, board,
commission, or other lawful authority. The term includes a
commitment to a mental institution involuntarily. The term
includes commitment for mental defectiveness or mental
illness. It also includes commitments for other reasons, such
as for drug use. The term does not include a person in a
mental institution for observation or a voluntary admission to
a mental institution.101
Federally licensed firearms dealers must use the National Instant
Criminal Background Check System (“NICS”) to perform background
checks on prospective firearm purchasers.102 The NICS Improvement
Amendments Act of 2007 requires states to contribute criminal records and
records of certain mental health-related adjudications or commitments to
NICS as a condition to receiving federal funds.103 The Act also requires
states to provide relief from disability-derived firearms restrictions through
“a State court, board, commission, or other lawful authority” if “the
person’s record and reputation[] are such that the person will not be likely
to act in a manner dangerous to public safety and that the granting of the
relief would not be contrary to the public interest.”104 Similar provisions
apply to federal departments or agencies that make mental health-related
adjudications or commitments.105
Assuming its constitutionality, federal law concerning mental illness
and firearms possession is, of course, supreme and—if vigorously
enforced—would render state laws on the subject moot. But federal law,
while supreme in its authority, is necessarily limited in its practical
enforcement. Except in fairly limited circumstances (e.g., an attempt to
purchase a firearm from a licensed dealer), a person disqualified by federal
law from firearms possession is unlikely to be arrested or prosecuted.
Most prosecutions take place under state law because state and local police
provide most criminal law enforcement within the United States.
B. State Regulation and NICS Reporting
One 2007 survey found that four states had no laws prohibiting
firearms possession by the mentally ill; twelve states prohibited the
mentally ill from obtaining a license to carry a concealed weapon only; and
101

27 C.F.R. § 478.11 (2013).
18 U.S.C. § 922(t); see also National Instant Criminal Background Check System, FED.
BUREAU INVESTIGATION, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/nics (last visited Apr. 30, 2014) (describing
the functions of NICS).
103
Pub. L. No. 110-180, §§ 102–103, 121 Stat. 2559, 2564–68.
104
Id. § 105, 121 Stat. at 2569–70.
105
Id. § 101(c)(2)(A).
102
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the remaining thirty-four states (plus the District of Columbia) prohibited,
in varying degrees or for varying periods, the mentally ill from possessing
firearms.106 In some jurisdictions, this is a prohibition on handguns, but in
others, it is a prohibition on any category of firearm.107
That sixteen states allow the severely mentally ill to purchase, receive,
or possess firearms is alarming, but this actually understates the severity of
the problem. Even states that have mental illness firearms-disability laws
often do not supply this disqualifying information to NICS. As of April
30, 2007, NICS had received 138,766 “disqualifying mental health
records” from the Veterans Administration, one record from the
Department of Defense, and 167,903 records from twenty-two of the fifty
states.108 The other twenty-eight states had submitted no mental illness
disqualifier records at all. Of the 167,903 records that were submitted,
ninety-two percent were from Michigan and Virginia.109 The most
populous state, California, had submitted a total of twenty-seven records.110
Further complicating this severe problem, states have the discretion to
submit records under the “denied persons file” instead of the “mental
defective file,” if, for example, there are concerns regarding patient
privacy.111 This option allows states to disqualify a person without
specifying a reason or turning over mental health records to NICS.112 It
should therefore be no surprise that NICS rejects an astonishingly low
number of firearms purchases for mental illness. In 2010, NICS received
approximately 10.4 million firearms transfer applications, of which
152,850 were rejected.113
Only 5879 applications were rejected
106
Joseph R. Simpson, Bad Risk?: An Overview of Laws Prohibiting Possession of Firearms by
Individuals with a History of Treatment for Mental Illness, 35 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 330,
333 (2007).
107
Id.
108
Lethal Loopholes; Deficiencies in State and Federal Gun Purchase Laws: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Domestic Policy of the H. Comm. on Oversight and Government Reform, 110th Cong.
138 (2007) [hereinafter Lethal Loopholes Hearing] (statement of Rachel L. Brand, Assistant Att’y Gen.
for Legal Policy, Department of Justice).
109
Id.
110
Id. The Department of Veterans Affairs submits mental disqualification records when it has
assigned a fiduciary to manage an individual’s financial affairs because he “lacks the mental capacity to
manage his or her own financial affairs regarding disbursement of funds without limitation, and is
either rated incompetent by VA or adjudged to be under legal disability by a court of competent
jurisdiction.” EDWARD C. LIU ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43040, SUBMISSION OF MENTAL
HEALTH RECORDS TO NICS AND THE HIPAA PRIVACY RULE 3 (2013), available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43040.pdf. As might be expected, there is some dispute as to
whether all such cases are appropriately reported to NICS; the Social Security Administration has no
similar rule for when a fiduciary manages financial benefits. Id. at 3.
111
Lethal Loopholes Hearing, supra note 108, at 11.
112
Id.
113
RONALD J. FRANDSEN ET AL., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, NCJ 238226, BACKGROUND
CHECKS FOR FIREARMS TRANSFERS, 2010—STATISTICAL TABLES, at 4 tbl.2 (2013). Of the 2010
rejections, 36,672 (24%) were appealed, and 12,275 (33.5%) of the appeals were reversed. Id. at 7
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specifically due to mental illness or disability.
Because the “denied
persons file” provides a way for states to disqualify a person without
mentioning mental illness, at least some of the 20,667 rejections for “other
prohibitions” might be attributable to such conditions.115
A few states perform their own background checks, using the state’s
own records as well as the resources of NICS, but do not necessarily
submit mental health disqualifying records to NICS.116 One consequence
is that a state may successfully block a mentally ill person from buying a
firearm in that state, but the person may take up residence in another state
and not be blocked from purchasing firearms.117 The new state of
residence does not have access to the previous state’s mental illness
records, nor does NICS.118 One example where submitting records to
NICS made a real difference is that of Virginia, which started submitting
mental health disqualifier records in November 2003.119 Three years later,
Virginia’s records had prevented not only sixty purchase attempts in that
same state, but also 378 purchase attempts in other states.120
C. Changing State Regulations and NICS Reporting Practices in the Wake
of Recent Tragedies
For those wondering if or how the Virginia Tech massacre fits into
Virginia’s 2003 change in procedure, it does not. The killer, Seung-Hui
Cho, was not involuntarily committed to a hospital, despite concerns by the
special judge who presided over the hearing that Cho was an imminent
threat to himself and others.121 Cho was ordered, however, to engage in
outpatient treatment.122 Because of differences in how federal and Virginia
law define firearms disability with respect to mental illness, Cho’s
purchases were in violation of federal law but not clearly in violation of
Virginia law.123 The ambiguity of whether court-ordered outpatient
treatment qualified as “involuntary commitment” under Virginia law
tbl.6.
114
See id. at 6 tbl.4 (reflecting the combined figure of 1.8% of 72,659 FBI rejections and 5.7% of
80,191 state and local agency rejections).
115
See id. (reflecting the combined figure of 0.3% of 72,659 FBI rejections and 25.5% of 80,191
state and local agency rejections).
116
Background Checks for Guns: What You Need to Know, NBC NEWS (Apr. 10, 2013),
http://usnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/04/10/17689167-background-checks-for-guns-what-you-needto-know?lite.
117
Lethal Loopholes Hearing, supra note 108, at 139.
118
Id.
119
Id.
120
Id.
121
VA. TECH REVIEW PANEL, MASS SHOOTINGS AT VIRGINIA TECH 48, 56 (2007), available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/metro/documents/vatechreport.pdf.
122
Id. at 48.
123
Id. at 71–72.
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would appear to be why Cho’s handgun purchases were allowed by the
background check and not reported to NICS. Note that this ambiguity was
corrected by an executive order from Governor Kaine in the days
following the murders.124
Improved reporting of mental-health disqualifiers to NICS would
reduce firearms purchases by those prohibited by federal law. In response
to recent tragedies, federal financial assistance, and encouragement from
the Department of Justice,125 there has been a dramatic increase in the
number of states that now submit mental incompetence records to NICS or
are preparing to do so.
In New Jersey, the roadblock to submission appears to have been the
courts. The New Jersey courts recently announced that they had submitted
“nearly 413,000 records to the New Jersey State Police to forward to
federal authorities” for addition to NICS.126 At least part of what made this
possible was a revision to state law “clarifying that disclosure of mental
health records does not violate privacy laws.”127 But along with these
413,000 records of involuntary commitments, “[i]nformation about
thousands of individuals who voluntarily seek admission to mental health
treatment facilities also will be submitted for inclusion on the NICS using
the existing infrastructure at no additional cost,”128 even though the federal
definition specifically excludes voluntary commitments from the federal
disability.129 This inclusion of voluntary commitments creates a serious
due process problem, because these voluntary commitments are
indistinguishable from the involuntary commitments when NICS must
decide whether to reject a firearm purchase.
Unsurprisingly, after the Newtown tragedy, Connecticut “is creating a
database of individuals who are disqualified from owning a gun for mental
health reasons.”130 Unlike New Jersey, news coverage indicates that the
state is conforming to the federal requirements by only including those
who have been involuntarily committed and those “who have been found
incompetent to stand trial or not guilty due to insanity.”131 State officials
124

Id. at 72–73.
See Lethal Loopholes Hearing, supra note 108, at 137–38 (explaining federal “outreach
efforts” to encourage increased state reporting).
126
David Levinsky, 413,000 NJ Mental Health Records Submitted for Gun Checks, BURLINGTON
CNTY. TIMES (Aug. 27, 2013), http://www.burlingtoncountytimes.com/news/local/burlington_county_t
imes_news/nj-mental-health-records-submitted-for-gun-checks/article_2b01c264-3fd8-5b03-8c771482d55ed2a3.html.
127
Id.
128
Id.
129
See 27 C.F.R. § 478.11 (2013) (“The term [commitment] does not include a person in a mental
institution for observation or a voluntary admission to a mental institution.”).
130
Jenny Wilson, Banned List for Owning Guns; State Creating Database for Better Reporting;
Mental Health, HARTFORD COURANT, May 8, 2013, at A1.
131
Id.
125
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report that they have already found disqualifying records not previously
submitted to NICS.132
Pennsylvania also submitted more than 600,000 disqualifying mental
health records to NICS in January 2013—records not previously provided
by the state police.133 Complicating this decision is that about seventy to
seventy-five percent of those records were “302 Commitments.”134 The
302 Commitment is “the shortest and most common type of involuntary
mental health commitment.”135 Recently, the ATF acknowledged that it is
“reviewing whether Pennsylvania’s 302 commitment is a federal
prohibition under federal law.”136 The emergency nature of a 302
Commitment is posited on concern that the subject is an imminent threat to
self or others, and the short-term nature of the commitment (120 hours)137
limits the damage that such a commitment does to a subject’s rights. It
seems like a reasonable balancing of the individual’s rights and the state’s
desire to protect both others and the subject of the commitment. However,
the submission of a 302 Commitment to NICS, which deprives an
individual of the right to keep and bear arms for years in the future, is
neither emergency in nature (because it will take days for that information
to become operative in the NICS database), nor temporary in its
consequences (because it will deprive an individual of the right to bear
arms for years). It seems unlikely that a long-term commitment or
deprivation of fundamental rights would be so readily tolerated by the
federal courts without a more formal procedure.
Maine amended its state law in 2008 to clarify that allowing state
agencies to “releas[e] information about involuntarily committed
individuals” did not violate the privacy rights of patients.138 Maine has
since wanted to submit mental health disqualifiers to NICS, but a lack of
resources has prevented court officials from processing approximately
5000 records to find out how many qualify as involuntary commitments.139
132

Id.
Moriah Balingit, Pa. Sends Mental Health Data for Gun Checks, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE,
Jan. 19, 2013, at A1.
134
Id.; see also 50 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7302 (West 2014) (allowing for involuntary
commitment for up to 120 hours of observation based on a doctor’s belief that a patient “is severely
mentally disabled and in need of immediate treatment”). Pennsylvania’s 302 Commitment statute does
not provide individuals with any advance notice or opportunity for a hearing, but the Third Circuit has
held that the statute satisfies procedural due process requirements in light of the “emergency situation”
and “short-term commitment.” Benn v. Universal Health Sys., 371 F.3d 165, 174 (3d Cir. 2004).
135
Balingit, supra note 133.
136
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
137
50 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7302(d).
138
Robert Long, How Does Maine Balance Public Safety and Gun Rights of Mentally
Ill?,BANGOR DAILY NEWS (Jan. 18, 2013), http://bangordailynews.com/2013/01/18/politics/how-doesmaine-balance-public-safety-and-gun-rights-of-mentally-ill/.
139
Id.
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In the aftermath of the Newtown tragedy, Governor Deval Patrick of
Massachusetts sought legislative approval to submit mental health
disqualifier records from public psychiatric facilities to NICS.140 Mental
health advocacy organizations, such as the National Alliance on Mental
Illness of Massachusetts, opposed the bill, because “[a]n all-encompassing
database reinforces stigma and labels, and creates fear.”141 This may be
very true, but as discussed in Part I of this Article, that fear has a very real
factual basis.142
Other opponents of the Massachusetts proposal
misunderstood that such records were only for involuntary commitments,
and not for outpatient or voluntary inpatient treatment. For example,
Professor James Alan Fox stated that “banning gun possession for people
who go to psychiatrists ‘would only discourage people from getting
treatment.’”143
The Newtown tragedy has certainly given strong impetus to states to
submit involuntary commitment and other mental illness disqualifying
records to NICS. Some are doing what the law requires and carefully
separating voluntary from involuntary commitments. Other states are
opening up a can of worms by failing to make that distinction. This both
violates the rights of persons who voluntarily enter a mental hospital for
treatment and may discourage persons who are severely depressed, but are
reluctant to risk the loss of firearms rights.
V. DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION AND FIREARMS REGULATION
FOR THE MENTALLY ILL
A. The Societal Momentum for Deinstitutionalization
It may seem a bit startling that regulation of firearms possession by the
mentally ill has only occurred in relatively recent times, until we examine
the history of how American society has handled the problem of mental
illness. Until the 1960s, individuals with severe mental illness problems
were hospitalized fairly readily, sometimes for periods of months, and then
released, sometimes forever, depending on how well they responded to
treatment.144 Under the best of conditions, state mental hospitals were not
good environments for the mentally ill. But today, we have switched to
even worse alternatives: life on the street for many; death from exposure
140
Lee Hammel, Mental Health Factor in Trying to Reduce Mass Killings, WORCESTER
TELEGRAM & GAZETTE, Feb. 24, 2013, at A1.
141
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
142
See supra Part I (discussing the correlation between mental health and violence).
143
Hammel, supra note 140.
144
See CLAYTON E. CRAMER, MY BROTHER RON: A PERSONAL AND SOCIAL HISTORY OF THE
DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION OF THE MENTALLY ILL 77 (2012) (“There were patients who entered public
mental hospitals, and stayed there for life . . . . [M]any others . . . were released within a year.”)
(emphasis added).
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and disease for some; jail or prison for others; and tragic headlines for a
few who become national news stories.145
The desire for a more humane approach led to deinstitutionalization of
the mentally ill in the 1960s and the 1970s. In the period immediately after
World War II, state mental hospitals were often dreadful, barbarous places,
at least in part because of funding problems caused by the Great
Depression and World War II.146 State mental hospitals also cared for the
senile elderly and syphilitic insane, creating severe crowding in what were
often unpleasant custodial institutions.147 Until the introduction in 1954 of
the first antipsychotic medication, chlorpromazine, the first choices for
managing a patient who posed a danger to self or others were a straitjacket,
electroconvulsive therapy (“shock treatment”), or a prefrontal lobotomy.148
A perfect storm of public policy emerged in the period between the
end of World War II and 1980, as multiple movements collided to produce
the deinstitutionalization movement, which nearly became the antithesis of
humane treatment of the mentally ill.149 Good intentions were not in short
supply, but good intentions were not enough. The emerging psychiatry
movement dominated the profession and the National Institute of Mental
Health was formed.150 Through these institutions, psychiatry promoted a
model that had worked well with soldiers suffering from combat fatigue,
but was completely inappropriate for the civilian psychotic population.151
B. The Changed Legal Standards Relating to Deinstitutionalization
Other movements rapidly collided, ultimately with disastrous results.
The emerging counterculture distrusted authority and middle-class values,
and soon had its partisans in the establishment.152 Civil libertarians
insisted on a very strict standard of due process that was substantially at
odds with the American tradition of civil commitment law.153 In Lessard v.
Schmidt,154 a federal district court struck down Wisconsin’s involuntary
commitment statute for two reasons.155 First, it failed to provide the patient
with sufficient notice of her proceedings and an opportunity to have a
lawyer represent her interests.156 Second, and perhaps more importantly, it
145

Id. at 51.
Id. at 76.
147
Id. at 77.
148
Id. at 48–49, 55.
149
Id. at 51, 57.
150
Id. at 54.
151
Id. at 51.
152
Id. at 66–75.
153
Id. at 105–23.
154
349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated on other grounds, 414 U.S. 473 (1974).
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Id. at 1103.
156
Id. at 1093, 1099.
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rejected the traditional parens patriae role of government to watch over the
interests of the patient157 and required that the government prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that a person was “mentally ill and dangerous.”158
Backing away from Lessard’s use of the standard of proof for criminal
convictions, the U.S. Supreme Court in Addington v. Texas159 replaced the
traditional preponderance of evidence standard for involuntary
commitment with a requirement for “clear and convincing evidence” of
mental illness.160 The Court reasoned that involuntary commitment
involved both the deprivation of liberty and the stigma associated with
mental illness.161 In Vitek v. Jones,162 the Court ruled that due process
requirements must even be satisfied before a convicted felon is transferred
from a prison to a mental hospital.163 The prisoner in the case was still
within his original sentence, yet the Court explained that “involuntary
commitment [would be] more than a loss of freedom from confinement”
for him because it subjects individuals to involuntary psychiatric treatment
and stigmatization.164
At the same time, some commentators insisted that the state had a duty
to provide treatment as a condition of holding certain mental health
patients.165 In some cases, the goal was openly stated: the threat to release
mental patients would force legislatures to spend the requisite money to
provide treatment, instead of simply warehousing the mentally ill.166
157
See id. at 1085 (explaining that the “American innovation [of parens patriae] resulted in total,
and perhaps permanent, loss of liberty”).
158
See id. at 1095 (“The argument for a stringent standard of proof is more compelling in the case
of a civil commitment in which an individual will be deprived of basic civil rights and be certainly
stigmatized by the lack of confidentiality of the adjudication. We therefore hold that the state must
prove beyond a reasonable doubt all facts necessary to show that an individual is mentally ill and
dangerous.”).
159
441 U.S. 418 (1979).
160
Id. at 427.
161
Id. at 429.
162
445 U.S. 480 (1980).
163
Id. at 493–94.
164
Id. at 492, 494.
165
See, e.g., David L. Bazelon, The Right to Treatment: The Court’s Role, 20 HOSP. &
COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 129–30 (1969) (defending his decision in Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451
(D.C. Cir. 1966), which found that a person who is involuntarily committed following acquittal of a
crime by reason of insanity must either be treated within a reasonable amount of time or released).
More recently, the Supreme Court recognized that the lone penological goal of incapacitation could be
appropriate in some situations, for “it would be of little value to require treatment as a precondition for
civil confinement of the dangerously insane when no acceptable treatment existed.” Kansas v.
Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 366 (1997).
166
See Morton Birnbaum, The Right to Treatment, 46 A.B.A. J. 499, 502–03 (1960) (arguing for
“the recognition and enforcement of the legal right of a mentally ill inmate of a public mental
institution to adequate medical treatment for his mental illness”). Birnbaum’s argument for such a right
to treatment was not based on any recognizable constitutional provision, but simply that if this “right to
treatment were to be recognized and enforced, it [would] be shown that the standard of treatment in
public mental institutions probably [would] be raised.” Id. at 499.

1328

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:1301

Whatever the pragmatic arguments for this might be, it represented a
dramatic change in the American legal tradition. In O’Connor v.
Donaldson,167 the Court held that “[a] finding of ‘mental illness’ alone”
does not justify holding a mental patient against his will and that release is
required if the patient is “dangerous to no one and can live safely in
freedom.”168 While the Court did not reach the specific question of
whether the state must provide treatment during involuntary
commitments,169 Chief Justice Burger reflected on the developing
movement in that area in his concurrence:
[T]he idea that States may not confine the mentally ill except
for the purpose of providing them with treatment is of very
recent origin, and there is no historical basis for imposing
such a limitation on state power . . . . It may be that some
persons [who do not acknowledge their illness or cooperate
with treatment] . . . are unable to function in society and will
suffer real harm to themselves unless provided with care in a
sheltered environment.170
Civil libertarians also furthered a campaign insisting that patients have
a right to refuse treatment.171 Among the more astonishing decisions
embracing this rationale comes from the Massachusetts Supreme Court.172
Against the advice of a psychiatrist, a schizophrenic minor with a history
of criminal behavior refused antipsychotic medication at a state hospital.173
The minor’s father sought contingent authority to authorize this treatment
out of concern for the well-being of his son.174 Under the circumstances,
the court found that the approach to treatment would require a “substituted
judgment determination.”175
This determination involves a court
substituting its judgment for what the minor might have decided to do had

167

422 U.S. 563 (1975).
Id. at 575.
169
Id. at 573.
170
Id. at 582–84.
171
E. Fuller Torrey & Mary Zdanowicz, Op-Ed, Why Do Severely Mentally Ill Go Untreated?,
BOS. GLOBE, Aug. 1, 1998, at A11. It is worth noting that in prison settings, the U.S. Supreme Court
has recognized that the state can “treat a prison inmate who has a serious mental illness with
antipsychotic drugs against his will, if the inmate is dangerous to himself or others and the treatment is
in the inmate’s medical interest.” Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 227 (1990).
172
See In re Guardianship of Roe, 421 N.E.2d 40, 43 (Mass. 1981) (holding that state hospital
psychiatrists and the father of a mentally ill minor did not have authority to overrule the minor’s
decision to refuse antipsychotic medication).
173
Id. at 44.
174
Id. at 50.
175
Id.
168
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176

he been sane.
But what would the minor have decided if he were sane?
As the same court explained in a later decision, “The likelihood of
improvement or cure enhances the likelihood that an incompetent patient
would accept treatment, but it is not conclusive.”177 A mentally
incompetent person, if he had been sane, might decide that sanity is
preferable to insanity, but this is by no means certain.178 As a result, states
that had at least an obligation to provide care for the severely mentally ill,
if they were held involuntarily, could face competing pressures to provide
no care at all.
In addition, some of the lawsuits initiated against deplorable state
mental hospitals dramatically increased their operating costs, and further
encouraged states to deinstitutionalize. For example, in Wyatt v.
Stickney179 a federal district court ruled, not too surprisingly, that patients
enjoy a constitutional right to send sealed mail.180 But the court also
decided that there was a constitutional right to a specific number of clerical
support staff per patient.181 The net effect of Wyatt was to both
micromanage local mental hospitals and dramatically increase their
operating costs.
C. The Deinstitutionalization Transition: From State Mental Hospitals to
Streets and Prisons
Soon, state mental hospitals were emptied of many of their patients—
from 559,000 in 1955 to 110,000 in 1990182—during a period when the
U.S. population rose by fifty percent.183 To be fair, some of this dramatic
reduction was because of Medicare’s willingness to pay private nursing
homes to care for the elderly senile, but not to reimburse state mental
hospitals for it.184 This created an economic incentive for states to move a
large portion of their patients to private nursing care (where death rates
176
Id. The court noted that its decision was confined to non-emergency situations and that an
individual’s right to refuse treatment could be overridden if necessary to prevent harm to the patient or
others. Id. at 59.
177
Rogers v. Comm’r of Dep’t of Mental Health, 458 N.E.2d 308, 319 (Mass. 1983).
178
Id.
179
344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972).
180
Id. at 379.
181
Id. at 383.
182
David Mechanic & David A. Rochefort, Deinstitutionalization: An Appraisal of Reform, 16
ANN. REV. SOC. 301, 301 (1990).
183
Historical National Population Estimates: July 1, 1900 to July 1, 1999, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/population/estimates/nation/popclockest.txt (last updated June 28,
2000).
184
MICHAEL J. DEAR & JENNIFER R. WOLCH, LANDSCAPES OF DESPAIR: FROM
DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION TO HOMELESSNESS 65–66, 140–42 (1987); Margaret W. Linn & Shayna
Stein, Nursing Homes as Community Mental Health Facilities, in HANDBOOK ON MENTAL HEALTH
POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 267, 270–71 (David A. Rochefort ed., 1989).
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were higher, perhaps because of aggressive cost-cutting by these profitmaking institutions).185 The introduction of antibiotics for the treatment of
syphilis after World War II also gradually eliminated the syphilitic insane,
who had accounted for between six and twenty-two percent of mental
hospital patients during the twentieth century.186
While California was a leader in the deinstitutionalization of the
mentally ill, its experience was not completely unusual. California saw a
67% decline in non-elderly state mental hospital patients between 1955 and
1977, as deinstitutionalization increasingly returned the mentally ill to
community-based mental health treatment facilities.187 In practice, because
so many of the severely mentally ill refused to accept treatment in a
voluntary setting, deinstitutionalization returned them not so much to the
community, as to park benches, the lobbies of public buildings, and
alleys.188 One recent critic of the growing incarceration rate for the
mentally ill argued that it could be remedied by addressing four key
problems: (1) homelessness; (2) the frequent failure to reapply for
Medicaid benefits following prison release; (3) substance abuse disorders;
and (4) stigmatization.189 While these factors may certainly contribute to
the mentally ill’s failure to receive proper treatment, the most basic
problem of all should not be discounted: refusal by the severely mentally
ill to recognize that they are in need of treatment.
As millions of unsupervised and untreated mental patients returned to
the streets, there was little in the way of either theoretical or practical
regulation of firearms access by the mentally ill. Sometimes, Social
Security disability checks went to persons with hallucinations and
delusions.190 For example, it appears that Patrick Purdy’s Social Security
disability checks paid for the weapons that he used for the first of the
schoolyard massacres in 1989.191 The question is not why the period from
1980 to the present has been awash in these random acts of mass murder,
disproportionately committed by people with very serious mental illnesses.
185
See GERALD N. GROB, FROM ASYLUM TO COMMUNITY: MENTAL HEALTH POLICY IN MODERN
AMERICA 267–69 (1991) (demonstrating financial restrictions on state mental health hospitals);
GERALD N. GROB, THE MAD AMONG US: A HISTORY OF THE CARE OF AMERICA’S MENTALLY ILL 266
(1994) [hereinafter GROB, THE MAD AMONG US] (illustrating the patient shift to private nursing care).
186
GROB, THE MAD AMONG US, supra note 185, at 124–25; MASS. STATE BD. OF INSANITY,
FIFTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE STATE BOARD OF INSANITY OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF
MASSACHUSETTS 45 (1914).
187
DEAR & WOLCH, supra note 184, at 65–66, 140–42.
188
Id.
189
Christina Canales, Note, Prisons: The New Mental Health System, 44 CONN. L. REV. 1725,
1727 (2012).
190
See, e.g., Johnson v. Astrue, 493 F. Supp. 2d 652, 655, 657 (W.D.N.Y. 2007) (defining
hallucinations and delusions as impairments for the purposes of qualifying for Social Security disability
income).
191
Glen Morgan, The Assault Rifle Controversy, 3 J. POL. & SOC. 21, 24 (1991).
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Arguably, the question should instead be: why have we as a society been
so lucky? Given these circumstances, the number of mass murders could
potentially have been much higher.
The answer is the advent of the incarceration revolution, which began
in the late twentieth century and caused prison populations to
“skyrocket[].”192 Many dangerous mentally ill individuals that may have
been institutionalized in another era were imprisoned. This prevented what
might have been a far more serious murder problem, although at very
substantial costs to mentally ill prisoners. Harcourt’s work demonstrates
that, while the mentally ill from the 1990s forward were not hospitalized
much, they were still being incapacitated via jails and prisons193—which is
why murder rates fell.
VI. DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION’S CONSEQUENCES
A. A Different View of the State
The previous discussion alludes to many recent tragedies being the
consequence of a well-intentioned effort to improve conditions for the
mentally ill by emptying state mental hospitals. Some of this was simply a
consequence of legislative miscalculation and a failure to correct mistakes.
But there was also a radical abrogation of the traditional duty of the state,
which Chief Justice Burger described in his concurring opinion in
O’Connor: “[T]he States are vested with the historic parens patriae power,
including the duty to protect ‘persons under legal disabilities to act for
themselves.’ The classic example of this role is when a State undertakes to
act as ‘the general guardian of all infants, idiots, and lunatics.’”194
Traditionally, state governments were assumed to be looking out for
the best interests of the mentally ill, and thus the preponderance of
evidence standard was considered sufficient for involuntary
commitment.195 Civil libertarians zealously insisted, largely based on
theoretical models that often denied that mental illnesses such as
schizophrenia even existed,196 that a much more demanding standard be
192

Harcourt, supra note 30, at 3.
Harcourt, supra note 26, at 1773.
194
O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 583 (1975) (Burger, C.J., concurring) (citations
omitted) (quoting Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 257 (1972)).
195
See, e.g., State v. Turner, 556 S.W.2d 563, 566 (Tex. 1977) (“In future cases of civil
commitment the jury should be instructed that the burden is upon the State to prove by a preponderance
of the evidence the statutory prerequisites to commitment.”).
196
See CRAMER, supra note 144, at 68–74, 111, 115 (reviewing arguments by Szasz and Laing
concerning the non-existence of schizophrenia and explaining how lawyers advocating for stricter
standards, as a matter of civil liberties, knew nothing about mental illness except for what they had read
from Szasz); see also Alan Kerr, Interview: Thomas Szasz, 21 PSYCHIATRIC BULL. 39, 41 (1997)
(including Szasz’s proud description of how he completed his psychiatric residency without ever
193
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used for involuntary commitment, preferably “beyond a reasonable
doubt.”197
B. Increased Homelessness and Associated Mortality Rates
While this approach is superficially appealing, the intervening decades
have demonstrated the negative consequences of deinstitutionalization for
the mentally ill, and not just with respect to crime rates. Homelessness in
America was not even on the radar of the general public before 1980. A
plot of references to the word “homeless” in published works reveals a
startling increase several years after deinstitutionalization was fully
implemented in the late 1970s.198
This is not simply an artifact of increased discussion; studies of the
homeless from the 1980s through the present have found that the homeless
are disproportionately mentally ill.199 Where attempts were made to
determine causality, the mental illness was usually found to have preceded
having any contact with psychotic patients and how, after he was drafted into the Navy, he went
through the motions of being a psychiatrist: “The servicemen didn’t want to be in the Navy and played
the role of mental patient. I didn’t want to be in the Navy and played the role of military psychiatrist:
My job was to discharge the men from the Service as ‘neuropsychiatric casualties.’”).
197
Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 421 (1979) (indicating that the appellant had requested at
trial that the court use “beyond a reasonable doubt” as the standard of proof for involuntary
commitment).
198
GOOGLE BOOKS NGRAM VIEWER, https://books.google.com/ngrams (last visited Apr. 15,
2014) (search “homeless” between “1900” and “2000” from the corpus “English” with a smoothing of
“3”).
199
DEAR & WOLCH, supra note 184, at 175–76; see also Leena L. Bachrach, The Homeless
Mentally Ill and Mental Health Services, in THE HOMELESS MENTALLY ILL: A TASK FORCE REPORT OF
THE AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION 16–19 (H. Richard Lamb ed., 1984) (reporting that 40% of
179 homeless men and women in a Philadelphia shelter were found to have “major mental disorders,”
with one-third diagnosed as schizophrenic and one-fourth diagnosed as having substance abuse
problems, and further that 40% of 78 Boston shelter residents had major mental disorders, 51% had less
severe psychiatric problems, and the remaining 9% were largely dependent spouses and children); Irene
Shifren Levine & Loretta K. Haggard, Homelessness as a Public Mental Health Problem, in
HANDBOOK ON MENTAL HEALTH POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 184, at 293, 294–99, 306
(noting that the mentally ill are at a high risk of becoming homeless and that “[h]omelessness is in part
a public mental health problem”); Pamela J. Fischer et al., Mental Health and Social Characteristics of
the Homeless: A Survey of Mission Users, 76 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 519, 521–22 (1986) (explaining that
in one study 37% of homeless persons were diagnosed as suffering a mental disorder compared to 18%
of household males, and that “[o]ne-third of the homeless had a previous psychiatric hospitalization
compared to only 5 percent of male householders”); Shirley N. Harris et al., Physical Health, Mental
Health, and Substance Abuse Problems of Shelter Users, 19 HEALTH & SOC. WORK 37 (1994)
(summarizing a study of homeless shelter residents that found that only 26% had been previously
hospitalized for psychiatric problems, although 4.8% of those requested to participate declined because
their “psychiatric distress [was] too severe” and 29% declined for various reasons, including that they
“did not want any records made on themselves”); Cheryl Zlotnick et al., Long-Term and Chronic
Homelessness in Homeless Women and Women with Children, 25 SOC. WORK IN PUB. HEALTH 470,
472–74, 478 (2010) (illustrating that 50.6% of homeless women surveyed in a 1996 National Survey of
Health Assistance Providers and Clients had reported mental health problems within the previous year).
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200

homelessness.
While there were differences in methodology across
different studies, making exact comparisons questionable and trend
analysis statistically meaningless,201 even analysts who believed that
deinstitutionalization had been a positive step agreed that the dramatic
expansion of the homeless population in the 1980s was because large
numbers of mentally ill persons were either released from mental hospitals
or never committed.202
Deinstitutionalization-induced homelessness was not only tragic for
those living on the streets; it was a tragedy for those dying on them as well.
At the same time that deinstitutionalization was in full swing, hypothermia
deaths in America were on the rise. In 1974, the death rate was 0.164 per
100,000 people.203 By 1979, the death rate had doubled to 0.322 per
100,000.204 Hypothermia death rates continued to rise, peaking at 0.4 per
100,000 in 1985, before dropping back below 0.2 per 100,000 in the late
1990s.205 Not every person who died of hypothermia was mentally ill, but
a detailed study of hypothermia deaths in Washington, D.C. from 1972 to
1982 found that one-third were severely malnourished, four-fifths were
never reported missing, one-half had high blood ethanol levels, and most
were found in abandoned buildings or vehicles.206 It is difficult to consider
these population characteristics, which sound suspiciously like those of
mentally ill homeless people in America, and not suspect that the increase
in hypothermia death rates was partly attributable to deinstitutionalization.

200
See Judith A. Stein & Lillian Gelberg, Homeless Men and Women: Differential Associations
Among Substance Abuse, Psychosocial Factors, and Severity of Homelessness, 3 EXPERIMENTAL &
CLINICAL PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 75, 76–77 (1995) (“Most data indicate that the prevalence of
mental illness is about 20% to 30%. For instance, a survey of homeless people in Chicago . . . found
almost 25% had been in mental hospitals for at least 48 hr. Nearly one half had high levels of
depression, and one fourth showed some signs of psychotic thinking. . . . [I]ncidence of mental illness
is found with a high frequency in well-designed studies.” (citations omitted).
201
See RAEL JEAN ISAAC & VIRGINIA C. ARMAT, MADNESS IN THE STREETS: HOW PSYCHIATRY
AND THE LAW ABANDONED THE MENTALLY ILL 4–6 (1990) (comparing the statistical analysis of the
homeless population from various sources, including the U.S. Census and a study financed by the U.S.
Department of Agriculture).
202
H. Richard Lamb, Foreword to THE HOMELESS MENTALLY ILL: A TASK FORCE REPORT OF
THE AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, supra note 199, at xiii.
203
Nicholas Rango, Exposure-Related Hypothermia Mortality in the United States, 1970–79, 74
AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1159, 1159 (1984).
204
Id.
205
Compressed Mortality, 1979–1998 Request, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
http://wonder.cdc.gov/ucd-icd10.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2014) (group results by “ICD Chapter”;
select year “1985”; then, under ICD-9 codes, open “E901”; then click “send”; repeat previous steps for
year “1998”).
206
Rango, supra note 203, at 1160.
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C. Transformed Urban Environments
Along with its destructive effects on the mentally ill, homelessness led
to a hard-to-measure—but nonetheless obvious—decline in the quality of
life for the rest of society. In many urban areas, public libraries became
day shelters for the mentally ill. This should be of no surprise to anyone
who has lived in a big city during the last thirty years. What is surprising,
however, is how early the connection between the public library problem
and mental illness was recognized. In 1981, a New York Times article
detailed how public libraries around the country were dealing with what
the article called “problem patrons”:
The Library of Congress in Washington has recently been
patronized by a man wearing a yellow plastic wastebasket
over his head, an elderly woman who sped to the stacks of
telephone books in search of someone who had put a curse
on her, a woman who smelled so foul she cleared one whole
section of the main reading room, and a man the librarians
came to call Robin Hood. He wore a quiver of arrows, and
spent his time at the microfilm screen reading The Los
Angeles Times.207
A friend of mine, Norma Kennemer, worked at the main branch of the
Santa Rosa, California public library in the 1980s and 1990s. She shared
similar stories of mentally ill homeless people who would urinate in the
corners of the library, make frightening noises, sleep at the tables, and
generally create an environment that would have been grounds for at least
expulsion, if not arrest and commitment, in any American public library in
1960. The library staff was obligated to work with such “patrons” until
their actions became clearly criminal. She recounted what happened when
she observed that one of these mentally ill patrons was sitting at a table
with his pants down to his knees. Her supervisor was obligated by library
rules to attempt to first resolve the problem without the police. He
approached this exposed “patron” and diplomatically asked, “Sir, are you
appropriately attired for the library?”
Why was it necessary for librarians to take this hypercautious
approach? Because attempts to resolve behavioral problems could lead to
lawsuits—which was precisely the experience in Morristown, New Jersey.
The behavior and offensive smell of a homeless person named Kreimer led
to the adoption of a code of conduct, which prohibited loitering,
“unnecessary staring,” and following others around the library, and also
requiring library patrons to conform to community standards of
207
Gregory Jaynes, Urban Librarians Seek Ways To Deal With “Disturbed Patrons,” N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 24, 1981, at A16.
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cleanliness.
Kreimer filed suit against this allegedly discriminatory
code, seeking punitive and compensatory damages “stemming from his
ejection from the library.”209 At trial, Judge H. Lee Sarokin ruled that the
rules were discriminatory, and the ban on annoying other patrons violated
Kreimer’s right to freedom of speech:
The greatness of our country lies in tolerating speech with
which we do not agree; that same toleration must extend to
people, particularly where the cause of revulsion may be of
our own making. If we wish to shield our eyes and noses
from the homeless, we should revoke their condition, not
their library cards.210
Wiser heads prevailed on appeal. The Third Circuit concluded that the
rules were not unconstitutional and reversed Sarokin’s decision.211
Nonetheless, the cost of fighting this suit was substantial, with Morristown
paying $230,000 to Kreimer as a settlement for this violation of his
rights—and, by the time it was finished, Morristown had spent more than
one million dollars.212 The cost of fighting such lawsuits may certainly
discourage codes of conduct in these public spaces.
***
The purpose of this disparate list of social tragedies, many far removed
from the problem of mass murder, should be obvious: the decision to
replace American law’s traditional view of the proper role of government
in caring for those suffering severe mental illness problems with an
absolutist and novel notion of due process has produced a flood of social
problems. Because deinstitutionalization took place over a period of more
than a decade, and in different states in different years, the muddy water
rose slowly. Because the common origin of these social problems was not
immediately obvious, it was easy to see each wave as coming from a
separate storm. One wave did rise rapidly: widespread homelessness
starting in the late 1970s. Yet social scientists studying the homelessness
problem knew as early as 1984 that the homeless were disproportionately,
and in some samples predominantly, mentally ill.213 The unwillingness to
draw connections to the just-completed and radical social experiment of
208
Kreimer v. Bureau of Police for Morristown, 765 F. Supp. 181, 183–84 (D.N.J. 1991), rev’d,
958 F.2d 1242 (3d Cir. 1992).
209
Kreimer, 958 F.2d at 1248–49.
210
Kreimer, 765 F. Supp. at 183.
211
Kreimer, 958 F.2d at 1246.
212
John Cichowski, Some Riders Wear Suits, Some File Them, THE RECORD (Bergen County,
N.J.), Mar. 15, 2005.
213
See supra note 199 and accompanying text.
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deinstitutionalization was more about partisan politics than about sensible
public policy.
VII. THE RIGHTS OF THE MENTALLY ILL AND THE SECOND AMENDMENT:
IS THERE A CONFLICT?
There are several different ways to approach the question of whether
there is a conflict between the Second Amendment and the rights of the
mentally ill. But first, it is important to recognize that absolutist positions,
while politically satisfying and less analytically complicated, have little to
do with the U.S. Constitution.
As Justice Scalia’s opinion in District of Columbia v. Heller reminds
us, “There seems to us no doubt, on the basis of both text and history, that
the Second Amendment conferred an individual right to keep and bear
arms. Of course the right was not unlimited, just as the First Amendment’s
right of free speech was not.”214 At other times the Court has reminded us
that, no matter how strongly worded the guarantees of the Bill of Rights
may seem:
The law is perfectly well settled that the first ten amendments
to the Constitution . . . were not intended to lay down any
novel principles of government, but simply to embody
certain guaranties and immunities which we had inherited
from our English ancestors, and which had from time
immemorial been subject to certain well-recognized
exceptions arising from the necessities of the case.215
How did the United States get along for a century and a half with no
need for firearms disability laws for the mentally ill? Certainly, firearms
were not in short supply in early America and—with the exception of
blacks and Indians—the only substantial firearms regulations were those
requiring widespread gun ownership and sometimes requiring the carrying
of firearms.216 Nor can the dramatic and tragic increase in murder by the
mentally ill be ascribed to changes in gun regulation, which have generally
become more restrictive over this period.217 Nor can it be attributed to the
214

554 U.S. 570, 595 (2008).
Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 281 (1897).
216
See generally CLAYTON E. CRAMER, ARMED AMERICA: THE REMARKABLE STORY OF HOW
AND WHY GUNS BECAME AS AMERICAN AS APPLE PIE 1–16, 30–38 (2006); see also Nicolas J.
Johnson, Firearms Policy and the Black Community: An Assessment of the Modern Orthodoxy, 45
CONN. L. REV. 1491, 1516–18 (2013) (detailing a post-Civil War movement for the right for black
“freedmen” to keep and bear arms).
217
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2012) (prohibiting felons from possessing firearms or
ammunition); id. § 922(g)(9) (prohibiting those convicted of domestic violence misdemeanors from
possessing a firearm); id. § 922(r) (prohibiting certain categories of semiautomatic weapons); id.
§ 922(t)(1) (requiring waiting periods and background checks for handgun purchases); CAL. PENAL
215
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sudden availability of high-capacity semiautomatic weapons. For example,
the Colt AR-15, a semiautomatic version of the U.S. Army’s M-16, has
been available with thirty-round magazines for ownership by private
citizens since at least 1965.218 Additionally, thirteen-round semiautomatic
pistols have been advertised for sale since at least 1954.219 Semiautomatic
pistols with detachable magazines have been offered for sale to private
citizens since at least 1918.220
The lack of apparent conflict for most of our history appears to have
been because most persons whose mental illness problems were considered
to be a public safety concern were hospitalized. After hospitalization, in
most states into the 1960s, these persons were deemed legally incompetent
and were unable, for example, to obtain a driver’s license, vote, or manage
their financial affairs.221 A person confined to a mental hospital might
have been able to make a constitutional argument that denial of his right to
keep and bear arms violated either the Second Amendment or the various
state constitution analogs. But it seems most unlikely that, until the civil
rights revolution of the late twentieth century, any court or lawyer would
have taken such a claim seriously. The severely mentally ill were (as
today) a tiny fraction of the population, and the legal distinctions that
treated them differently seem to have produced only occasional and very
limited efforts at protecting their civil rights.
VIII. NAVIGATING DUE PROCESS CONCERNS
There is a strong case for states to prohibit the severely mentally ill
from possessing firearms. Granted, crafting an exact definition for
“severely mentally ill” presents a challenge. The federal standard for being
“adjudicated as a mental defective,” codified in 27 C.F.R. § 478.11,
arguably contains sufficient due process protections, as it requires a
specific finding of dangerousness or incompetence by a court, board,
commission, or other lawful authority.222 This standard might be
CODE § 30605(a) (West Supp. 2012) (criminalizing possession of certain assault weapons); see also
Richmond Boro Gun Club, Inc. v. City of New York, 97 F.3d 681, 683 (2d Cir. 1996) (discussing a
local law that “criminalizes the possession or transfer of certain assault weapons and ammunition
feeding devices within the city”).
218
Paul Wahl, Now You Can Buy a Hot Combat Rifle for Sport, POPULAR SCI., Feb. 1965, at 171,
171.
219
See, e.g., All the World Admires Browning, LIFE, Sept. 27, 1954, at 4, 4 (advertising a
Browning automatic pistol).
220
See, e.g., Our Duty, POPULAR SCI. MONTHLY, Nov. 1918, at 108, 108 (advertising Colt
weapons to civilian customers and asking them to be patient because all manufacturing capacity was
currently being used to satisfy government contracts for the military’s effort in World War I).
221
ALEXANDER D. BROOKS, LAW, PSYCHIATRY, AND THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM 820–22
(1974).
222
27 C.F.R. § 478.11 (2013); see supra text accompanying note 101 (presenting the regulation’s
complete text).
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considered an appropriate choice for the sixteen states that do not currently
prohibit firearms possession by the mentally ill or mentally incompetent.223
In contrast, New York State’s SAFE Act224 is clearly deficient in due
process. It requires physicians, psychologists, registered nurses, and
licensed clinical social workers to report to county mental health officials
any individual “for whom they are providing mental health treatment [that]
is ‘likely to engage in conduct that will cause serious harm to self or
others.’”225 If the county mental health official agrees with the report, he
must inform the state government agency that licenses firearms ownership,
who will then notify “the appropriate local licensing official, who must
suspend or revoke the license as soon as practicable.”226 This involves
immediate surrender of the firearms license and all firearms.227
The revocation of a firearms license might be considered stigmatizing,
but stigma alone is not sufficient to raise a due process objection. As the
Supreme Court has pointed out in Paul v. Davis,228 due process
considerations under the Fourteenth Amendment requires some liberty or
property interest to be at risk.229 The requirement that such persons must
surrender all firearms involves both a property interest (the firearm as a
material and presumably valuable object) and a liberty interest (the right to
keep and bear a firearm for self-defense).
This would seem a clear violation of existing precedents concerning
due process. A plethora of decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court have
recognized that due process requires “an adversary hearing before an
independent decisionmaker.”230 The gun owner accused under the SAFE
Act enjoys no right to a hearing of any sort, much less an adversary
hearing before the county mental health official who is the independent
decision maker.231 Even in a time of war, “due process demands that a
citizen held in the United States as an enemy combatant be given a
meaningful opportunity to contest the factual basis for that detention before
223

See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
2013 N.Y. Laws Ch. 1.
225
N.Y. STATE OFFICE OF MENTAL HEALTH & N.Y. STATE OFFICE FOR PEOPLE WITH
DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES, NEW YORK SECURE AMMUNITION AND FIREARMS ENFORCEMENT
ACT (NY SAFE ACT) GUIDANCE DOCUMENT 1 (2013) [hereinafter NY SAFE ACT GUIDANCE
DOCUMENT], available at http://www.omh.ny.gov/omhweb/safe_act/guidance.pdf.
226
Id. at 2.
227
Id.
228
424 U.S. 693 (1976).
229
Id. at 711–22. For an example of state supreme courts that have recognized both a liberty and
property interest in a concealed handgun license through state guarantees of a right to keep and bear
arms, see Kellogg v. City of Gary, 562 N.E.2d 685, 694–95 (Ind. 1990) and Caba v. Weaknecht, 64
A.3d 39, 63–64 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2013).
230
Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 485 (1980).
231
See NY SAFE ACT GUIDANCE DOCUMENT, supra note 225, at 1–2 (failing to require notice or
a hearing before a person can be deprived of his or her property).
224
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a neutral decisionmaker.”
A U.S. citizen seized in time of war on a
foreign battlefield enjoys this protection. Why should a U.S. citizen
accused of mental instability not enjoy at least the same opportunity to
contest his loss of rights? As indicated, there is also no opportunity under
the New York SAFE Act for a gun owner to receive notice of a hearing
before being deprived of his or her liberty. Yet the Supreme Court has
repeatedly held that due process includes prior notice of a hearing that
deprives one of liberty.233 This right of “adequate notice” is even required
when the deprivation of liberty is only the transfer from a prison to a
mental hospital.234 When a convict’s parole is to be revoked, he has a right
to advance notice of such a hearing.235 A welfare recipient enjoys the right
to a hearing before revocation of welfare benefits.236
Inconsistencies in existing laws and the right to an adversarial hearing
remain, and not just in the New York SAFE Act. For example, California
Family Code § 6389(a) prohibits a person subject to a protective order
from owning or possessing a firearm.237 Such protective orders may be
issued ex parte,238 precluding a gun owner from advance notice or an
adversarial hearing before the order takes effect. The usual justification for
ex parte orders is that delay may result in irreparable harm to one or more
parties. There are unquestionably many circumstances where failure to
disarm a party in a domestic violence dispute has led to murder. The
justification for disarming a person without due process is that there is risk
to life and limb if he is not disarmed.
But there is no opportunity for the gun owner to cross-examine
witnesses against him or present opposing evidence—contrary to existing

232

Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 509 (2004).
See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 579 (1975) (discussing how, in accordance with due
process, students facing interference with a protected property interest “must be given some kind of
notice and afforded some kind of hearing”); Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 550 (1965) (“[A]s to
the basic requirement of notice itself there can be no doubt . . . .”); Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Trust Co.,
339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950) (“Many controversies have raged about the cryptic and abstract words of the
Due Process Clause but there can be no doubt that at a minimum they require that deprivation of life,
liberty or property by adjudication be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the
nature of the case.”).
234
Vitek, 445 U.S. at 485.
235
See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 486–87 (1972) (“[T]he parolee should be given notice
that the hearing will take place and that its purpose is to determine whether there is probable cause to
believe he has committed a parole violation. The notice should state what parole violations have been
alleged.”).
236
See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261 (1970) (“Under all the circumstances, we hold that
due process requires an adequate hearing before termination of welfare benefits, and the fact that there
is a later constitutionally fair proceeding does not alter the result.”).
237
CAL. FAM. CODE § 6389(a) (West 2013).
238
Id. § 6218.
233
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precedent involving revocation of welfare benefits or of parole.240 As
Justice Scalia’s opinion for the Court in Crawford v. Washington241
observed, not only is there a right to cross-examine the statements of sworn
witnesses, but also “[a]n accuser who makes a formal statement to
government officers bears testimony in a sense that a person who makes a
casual remark to an acquaintance does not.”242 There is a real risk that a
gun owner might be disarmed simply because of a misunderstanding or
malicious falsehood and with no opportunity to correct or counter such
errors.
It is curious that the advocates of an exacting and absolutist due
process requirement for involuntary commitment have shown so little
interest in challenging this law. The SAFE Act does not give the gun
owner the opportunity to demand a hearing where the state must
demonstrate by even a preponderance of evidence that his possession of
firearms is a danger to public safety. There does not even seem to be a
provision for the gun owner to challenge this decision after the fact.
Pennsylvania’s system poses a different issue. There is a strong case
for states to submit mental incompetence records to NICS. But to avoid
rendering NICS data misleading, it is imperative that states only submit
records that conform to federal law. While Pennsylvania’s 302 involuntary
commitment has been upheld as conforming to due process requirements,
it is because 302 commitments are emergency and temporary in nature.243
If a 302 commitment is reported to NICS, the agency would prohibit the
person reported from possessing or purchasing firearms or ammunition in
the indefinite future, a deprivation of both liberty and property that is
neither emergency nor temporary.
IX. CONCLUSION
All of these gun control-related measures are good, but they will do
nothing for the 32.3% of murders that are committed without guns.244 Nor
239
See Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 259 (discussing the right of “personal appearance of the recipient
before the reviewing official, for oral presentation of evidence, and for confrontation and crossexamination of adverse witnesses”).
240
See Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 487 (“At the hearing the parolee may appear and speak in his own
behalf; he may bring letters, documents, or individuals who can give relevant information to the
hearing officer. On request of the parolee, a person who has given adverse information on which
parole revocation is to be based is to be made available for questioning in his presence.”).
241
541 U.S. 36 (2004).
242
Id. at 51. The Crawford Court additionally provided a history of the abuses of the denial of the
right to cross-examine witnesses and a discussion of the importance of the Sixth Amendment’s
guarantees. Id. at 42–53.
243
Benn v. Universal Health Sys., 371 F.3d 165, 174 (3d Cir. 2004).
244
Crime in the United States 2011: Expanded Homicide Data Table 7,
FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2011/crime-inthe-u.s.-2011/tables/expanded-homicide-data-table-7 (last visited Mar. 30, 2014).
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will they do anything for murders committed by mentally incompetent
persons who steal guns, as has been the case in at least two recent mass
murders,245 or who buy them on the black market.246 Nor will background
checks make a difference for persons who were not mentally ill when they
purchased a gun. There is also reason to wonder whether mandatory
firearms background checks actually do anything at all.247
There is, however, something that has been demonstrated to make a
difference: restoring our mental hospital system—and making it more
humane and more transparent this time. This can be accompanied by
involuntary outpatient commitment, which compels participation in
outpatient treatment as a condition of not being involuntarily
hospitalized.248
As Harcourt’s work strongly suggests, hospitalization reduces murder
rates.249 This is not surprising. It is far easier to prevent inmates in locked
wards from getting weapons than it is to prevent the mentally incompetent
from doing so in a free society. As Segal’s work demonstrates,250 not only
is ease of involuntary commitment a statistically significant determinant of
murder rates, but so are mental hospital bed availability and the quality of
the mental health care system. This should also not be surprising.
If reducing murder rates were the only consequence of correcting the
disastrous mistake of deinstitutionalization, it might be justifiable for that
reason alone. That is not, however, the only social gain from reversing
course on the failure of deinstitutionalization.
Reducing deaths from exposure should certainly qualify as a public
good. For all the faults of the old state mental hospitals, patients did not
freeze to death in them or regularly die of malnutrition, tuberculosis, or the
245
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other diseases that so often kill homeless people in America. Major mental
illness is associated with a seven to twenty-four year decrease in
lifespan.251
Reversing deinstitutionalization will have an economic cost, that of
rebuilding and staffing the now abandoned mental hospitals. But our
current system is spending astonishing amounts of money right now
dealing with the consequences of not institutionalizing the severely
mentally ill.
Mental hospitals cost money. So do prosecutions of mentally ill
offenders. The average U.S. criminal justice system cost for murder in
2008 dollars was $426,255.252 In 2014 dollars, that would be $464,817.253
It seems likely that these costs will be borne by the state because mentally
ill defendants are frequently indigent, and thus receive public defenders.
The United States had 12,664 murders in 2011.254 If eighteen percent of
those murders were by severely mentally ill offenders—a reasonable guess
based on the Indiana murder convict data discussed above255—that is
$1.015 billion spent on trials that could often have been preventable.
Moreover, the costs of incarceration after conviction are substantial.
Colorado is a pretty typical state; it currently spends $32,335 per year per
inmate.256 A mentally sane murderer who spends thirty years in prison will
cost $970,060 in 2011 dollars. Multiplied by 2279 murders per year, this is
a bill for $2.21 billion in current and accrued costs. However, states are
required to provide mental health services for prisoners.257 Mentally ill
inmates are more expensive for states to care for than sane inmates.258
Several years ago, Pennsylvania found that mentally ill prisoners cost
251
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$51,100 per year and sane prisoners $28,000 per year.
If a similar cost
differential applies nationally, the incarceration bill is $4.03 billion a year
in current and future costs. In light of these figures, trial costs plus current
and future incarceration costs would total $6.24 billion per year.
If involuntary commitment of those with serious mental illness
problems even prevented 455 murders a year (or twenty percent of the
murders by severely mentally ill offenders) it could save taxpayers $547
million per year for trials and incarceration, perhaps less, depending on the
number of plea bargains. That would pay for a lot of mental health
services. Victim costs are not included in these estimates. It seems likely
that anyone present at any of the recent mass murders would have gladly
paid more taxes to hospitalize mentally ill persons before they opened fire.
Finally, there is one other reason to admit that deinstitutionalization
was a mistake: the mentally ill homeless are parents, children, friends,
siblings—often too violent for family or friends to shelter, but still people
who deserve humane care, even if we cannot cure them. No one should be
sleeping on a steam grate, eating out of a trashcan, or wondering whether
he will survive the night. Not now. Not in our country.
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